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by 
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Advisor: Saul Kassin 
The Alford plea allows defendants to maintain their innocence while accepting a plea. 
Although this plea is more prevalent than jury trials, it is largely unknown to both lay people and 
researchers (Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009). Legal scholars have argued that the Alford plea may 
present an undue influence on innocent defendants who may not otherwise accept a plea, while 
other assert that the Alford plea is a beneficial alternative for defendants who want to preserve 
their reputation (Ronis, 2009; Ward, 2004). However, no research to date has explored either of 
these assumptions. 
The goals of the current research were to fill this gap and explore two important aspects 
of the Alford plea: (1) whether the opportunity to maintain innocence through an Alford plea 
increases the rate of innocent defendants pleading guilty, and (2) how Alford defendants are 
perceived by observers. To accomplish these goals, I conducted five studies. In the first two 
studies, actors were either asked to imagine being accused of cheating on an experimental task or 
being accused of involuntary manslaughter. Participants were then randomly assigned to be 
either guilty or innocent of the wrongdoing and were subsequently offered either a traditional 
plea that required them to admit guilt, or an Alford plea that enabled them to proclaim innocence 
in a written statement. They were then asked to provide their plea decision along with their 
reasons for accepting or rejecting. In three subsequent studies, I explored how observers viewed 
Alford defendants and their decision. Participants read about an individual being accused of 
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cheating or involuntary manslaughter, and then offered a traditional plea or an Alford plea. The 
individual then presented his plea decision and participants provided their perceptions of the 
individuals’ guilt, as well as his decision and character.  
In the actor studies, I found that guilty participants were significantly more likely to 
accept a plea compared to innocent participants. In contrast with predictions, Study 1 revealed 
that innocent Alford defendants were less likely to plea than other participants. However, a large 
part of innocent defendants who accepted cited the opportunity to maintain innocence as a reason 
for their plea decision. While the observer studies revealed little to no effect of the Alford plea 
on participants’ guilt perceptions, I found that participants consistently viewed the Alford 
defendant in a more negative light, rating him as less remorseful than other defendants. The 
implications of the results are discussed, particularly in the light of legal scholars’ stance on the 








First and foremost, I have to thank my advisor, Saul Kassin, for your support and invaluable 
advice on my journey through graduate school. Your knowledge, enthusiasm, and outrage with 
the justice system is inspiring and has driven my research, now and beyond. Your zeal 
encourages me to always press on. I am lucky to have met you.   
 
To Emily Haney-Caron, thank you for your unwavering support, both academic and personal. 
Although you came into my academic journey on the later side, you have given me so much. I 
wouldn’t be where I am today without you. 
 
To my committee—Steven Penrod, Allison Redlich, and Tina Zottoli. Thank you all for being 
brilliant, for conducting research that inspire me, and for supporting me and my research 
throughout this process. I am forever grateful for you all.  
 
Furthermore, I would like to thank AP-LS, the Forensic Psychology Research Institute, and the 
Early Research Initiative for funding this project and making it possible. A big thank you to my 
wonderful research assistant Sarah Lynch for your flexibility and positivity.  
To my friends and colleagues, past and current. Thank you for making the Ph.D. journey about 
more than just work. I couldn’t have done without your encouragement, sage advice, and endless 
support. A special thanks to Dr. Timothy Luke, for always being there to answer any questions. 
You are truly the best.   
 
To my partner, Ryan, thank you for always believing in me, even when I don’t. This long and 
winding road hasn’t been easy, but it would have been impossible without you. I love you.  
Finally, I want to thank my family. Mamma, du har alltid trott på mig och min förmåga utan 
minsta tvekan. Ingenting av det här skulle vara möjligt utan dig. Till resten av familjen Hellgren, 
ni har gjort mig till den jag är idag, jag älskar er alla. 
 
Thank you 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD  vii 
 





LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………...viii 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………ix 
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1  
OVERVIEW OF THE PLEA-BARGAINING SYSTEM..……………………………….5 
HISTORY OF ALFORD PLEAS……………………….…………………….…………..6 
THE INNOCENCE PROBLEM IN PLEA BARGAINING...……………………...…….8 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF ALFORD PLEAS…………………….….…….…….19 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH……..……………………………………………………………25 
STUDY 1………………………………………………………………….……………………..27  
METHOD………………………………………………………….…………………….27 
RESULTS………………………………………………………….…………………….35 





















THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD  ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1. Demographics (counts and percentages) across conditions (Study 1) 
TABLE 2. Percentage of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 1). 
TABLE 3. Categories for plea decision reasoning (Study 1 and 2). 
TABLE 4. Examples of reasons for plea decision (Study 1 and 2). 
TABLE 5. Participants’ reasoning behind plea decision broken down by plea decision, guilt 
status, and type of plea (Study 1 and 2). 
TABLE 6. Means and ANOVA statistics for effects of type of plea and guilt status on confidence 
in plea decision ratings (Study 1 and 2).  
TABLE 7. Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt (vs. innocence) perceptions by observers 
by type of plea and guilt status (Study 1). 
TABLE 8. Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type 
of plea and guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who 
rejected a plea (Study 1). 
TABLE 9. Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 1). 
TABLE 10. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status, 
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1). 
TABLE 11. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt 
status on satisfaction ratings (Study 1). 
TABLE 12. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt 
status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 
1). 
TABLE 13. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status, 
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1). 
TABLE 14. Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on case evaluation measures (Study 1). 
TABLE 15. Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 1).  
TABLE 16. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 1). 
TABLE 17. Percentages of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 
2). 
TABLE 18. Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea 
and guilt status (Study 2). 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD  x 
 
TABLE 19. Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type 
of plea and guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who 
rejected a plea (Study 2). 
TABLE 20. Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 2). 
TABLE 21. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status, 
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2). 
TABLE 22. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt 
status on satisfaction ratings (Study 2). 
TABLE 23. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt 
status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 
2). 
TABLE 24. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status, 
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2). 
TABLE 25. Means and ANOVA statistics for case evaluation measures (Study 2).  
TABLE 26. Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 2).  
TABLE 27. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 2).  
TABLE 28. Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea 
decision (Study 3). 
TABLE 29. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of confidence in guilt 
perception ratings (Study 3 and 4). 
TABLE 30. Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception measures (Study 3). 
TABLE 31. Percentage of participants reporting they would personally reject (vs. accept) by type 
of plea and plea decision (Study 3).  
TABLE 32. Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of defendant ratings (Study 3). 
TABLE 33. Means and ANOVA statistics for measures of student defendant remorsefulness and 
blameworthiness (Study 3). 
TABLE 34. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 3). 
TABLE 35. Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea 
decision (Study 4). 
TABLE 36. Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception ratings (Study 4).  
TABLE 37. Percentage of participants reporting they would personally accept (vs. reject) by type 
of plea and plea decision (Study 4).  
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD  xi 
 
TABLE 38. Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of defendant ratings (Study 4).  
TABLE 39. Means and ANOVA statistics for defendant remorsefulness and blameworthiness 
(Study 4). 
TABLE 40. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 4). 
TABLE 41. Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by plea condition (Study 
5). 
TABLE 42. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects on plea decision perception 
ratings (Study 5).  
TABLE 43. Counts and percentage of participants who would personally accept a plea, by plea 
condition (Study 5). 
TABLE 44. Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on perceptions of defendant ratings (Study 
5). 
TABLE 45. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 5). 
  
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD  xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1. Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on percentages of accepted plea 
(Study 1). 
FIGURE 2. Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on participants’ rating of the 
difficulty to make a plea decision (Study 1). 
FIGURE 3. Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on the degree to which 
consequences of rejecting the plea influenced participants’ plea decision (Study 1). 
FIGURE 4. Interaction effect of type of plea and plea decision on defendant honesty ratings 
(Study 3) 





THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  1 
 
The Psychological Allure of Alford: Why Innocents Plead Guilty 
 
Alford pleas are awful. There could hardly be a clearer violation of due process 
than sending someone to prison who has neither been found guilty nor admitted 
his guilt. If anything short of torture can shock your conscience, Alford pleas 
should. (Alschuler, 2003; p.1412). 
In 2001 in West Virginia, 19-year-old Joseph Buffey was arrested for a burglary and 
sexual assault of an elderly woman (Buffey v. Ballard, 2012). During a late-night interrogation, 
he confessed to the crimes but recanted just moments later. Despite maintaining his innocence 
since and throughout the investigation, Buffey was persuaded by his attorney to accept a plea 
deal to avoid up to 300 years in prison. After his conviction, The Innocence Project discovered 
that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory DNA evidence, which excluded Buffey and 
identified the perpetrator, a serial offender. Buffey sought relief after 15 years in prison. In 2015 
the West Virginia Supreme Court accepted the withdrawal of his guilty plea (Eckholm, 2015).  
Despite the court’s order, the prosecutor decided to retry Buffey in October of 2016 for 
the home invasion part of the crime for which he withdrew his plea. He also threatened to charge 
Buffey with statutory rape stemming from his relationship with a 13-year-old girlfriend when he 
was 15 years old. In exchange for dismissing all charges, Buffey was offered an Alford plea, 
allowing him to maintain his innocence in the burglary and sexual assault case but also requiring 
him to admit that there was enough evidence to convict him. Buffey, who was now out of prison, 
accepted the plea out of fear of going back (White, 2016).  
Unfortunately, the case of Joseph Buffey—and the many issues of plea bargaining which 
it exemplifies—is not unique: of the National Registry of Exonerations’ (2020) 2665 exonerees, 
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almost 20% had pled guilty to crimes they did not commit. Since the mid-1920s, plea bargaining 
has been the standard method through which criminal cases in the US are resolved (Dervan & 
Edkins, 2015). Because of the often substantial reduction in sentences offered to defendants 
through a plea deal, both legal scholars and social science researchers have explored the potential 
involuntary nature of the practice of plea bargaining (Bibas, 2003; Redlich et al., 2017). Legal 
scholars and psychologists have given significant attention to the issue of plea bargaining’s 
“innocence problem” (Redlich, Bibas et al. 2017). The motivating force behind the innocence 
problem derives from prosecutors overcharging defendants and then offering a plea with such a 
discounted charge and/or sentence that the defendant’s innocence or guilt is no longer the 
primary consideration (Podgor, 2010). Thus, most legal scholars and psychologists argue that the 
incentive to plead and the risk of going to trial exert undue pressure for both innocent and guilty 
defendants to plead guilty (Covey, 2011: Redlich, Bibas et al., 2017).  
In addition to initially accepting a plea despite being innocent, Joseph Buffey ultimately 
accepted an Alford plea to avoid further prison time (White, 2016). Though largely unknown to 
the public (Hellgren & Kassin, 2018), the Alford plea is more prevalent than jury trials with 6% 
of cases being resolved through an Alford plea, in contrast to only 3% of cases leading to trial 
(Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009; United States Sentencing Commission, 2017). The Alford plea and 
the traditional guilty plea are legally identical; that is, both result in the same direct and collateral 
consequences (Bibas, 2003). However, Alford defendants can be subject to additional negative 
consequences, such as more severe sentences and revocation of parole and probation, because of 
the perceived absence of expressed remorse (Ward, 2003).  
Some legal scholars contend that the Alford plea can be beneficial for defendants—
particularly to innocent defendants who may wish to avoid the stigma that accompanies taking 
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responsibility for a crime while avoiding the uncertainty of trial (Ronis, 2009). They argue that if 
defendants are advised of the consequences and make an informed decision, an Alford plea is the 
perfect solution for risk-averse, innocent defendants (Conklin, 2020; Ronis, 2009). However, I 
propose that these arguments rely on two assumptions: (1) innocent defendants will see the 
ability to publicly proclaim their innocence as appealing enough to overlook the additional 
negative collateral consequences to which an Alford plea can lead, and (2) defendants who accept 
an Alford plea will minimize the stigma of accepting responsibility for a violent crime and elicit 
fewer negative judgments from the public due to their assertion of innocence. Although these 
arguments are ubiquitous in the legal literature, they have not been subject to empirical research 
(Diehm, 2015).  
Researchers have historically applied the shadow-of-the-trial model to understand plea 
bargain decision making (Redlich et al. 2017). The shadow model posits that defendants base 
their decision to accept or reject a plea deal on the probable verdict and consequent sentencing   
outcome of a trial (Bibas, 2004). Because the Alford plea is in theory—though not in practice—
legally identical to a traditional plea, the shadow model predicts that defendants will judge an 
Alford in a similar manner (Ronis, 2009). This prediction contradicts the argument that innocent 
defendants would be particularly enticed by the Alford plea. Nevertheless, there are basic social 
psychology theories that may provide a framework that helps illuminate the potential appeal of 
Alford pleas. 
Plea bargaining literature has shown that defendants are likely to accept plea deals not 
only due to a substantial plea discount but also due to pressure to comply with authority figures, 
such as lawyers, prosecutors, and judges (Bordens & Bassett, 1985; Malloy et al. 2014). Yet 
innocent defendants who feel compelled to admit guilt to accept a traditional plea deal behave 
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contrary to their beliefs, which may well elicit negative stress, or cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957). The literature on dissonance reduction, in particular the self-affirmation theory posited by 
Claude Steele (1988), offers a framework through which to view the allure of the Alford plea. 
Self-affirmation suggests that the ability to assert one’s moral and positive self-concept is highly 
psychologically appealing and leads to a decrease in tension and anxiety (Steele & Lieu, 1983). 
Thus, the psychological benefits stemming from affirming one’s innocence may explain why a 
defendant would choose an Alford plea, seemingly against their own self-interest.  
Theories of self-presentation—and self-verification in particular—further suggest that 
individuals are highly motivated to self-present in a way that accurately conveys their self-view 
and have others confirm this view (Swann, 2012). This suggests that innocent defendants could 
be drawn to Alford pleas for the opportunity to publicly self-present as innocent, while still 
benefitting from the less risky choice of pleading instead of going to trial.  
The concepts of compliance, cognitive dissonance, and self-presentation could lend 
support to Alford supporters’ assertion that the Alford plea is a superior option for innocent 
defendants facing a decision in the shadow of trial. Alternatively, the behavior predicted by these 
psychological theories could contradict the previously mentioned assumptions. With a theoretical 
framework drawn from classic social psychology literature, the current studies explored these 
ideas and bridged the gap in the empirical literature by examining the allure of the Alford plea, as 
well as the public’s perception of defendants who take Alford pleas. The specific research 
questions the present project aimed to answer are as follows: 
1. Could the psychological benefits stemming from maintaining innocence be sufficient 
for innocent defendants—who may otherwise reject a plea deal—to act against their 
self-interest and accept an Alford plea? 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  5 
 
2. Do observers perceive defendants who accept Alford pleas as less guilty and thus less 
subject to negative judgement compared to those who accept traditional pleas? 
Overview of the Plea-Bargaining System 
The general public views the jury trial as the normative means of resolving criminal 
charges; however, trials are increasingly rare (Galanter, 2004), and are generally reserved for the 
most serious cases (Abrams, 2011; Kutateladze, & Lawson, 2018). It is estimated that about 97% 
of both state and federal cases are now resolved through plea agreements (including Alford and no 
contest pleas), not trials (United States Sentencing Commission, 2017).  
The legal system has long benefitted from plea bargaining and the practice has been 
touted as an effective tool to dispose of cases quickly and efficiently (Alschuler, 1979). 
Defendants get the chance to serve a lesser sentence for their crimes, and the criminal justice 
system avoids being overburdened by the number of cases (Levenson, 2012). Although the 
United States Supreme Court initially disfavored the plea-bargaining practice, deeming it 
coercive and corrupt, it quickly rose in popularity when the Civil War brought with it rapidly 
rising crime rates (Dervan & Edkins, 2015). In 1967, the American Bar Association gave its 
blessing to plea bargaining in the Standards for Criminal Justice (American Bar Association, 
1999), and in 1970 the U.S Supreme Court agreed and established that plea bargaining was 
constitutional (Brady v. United States, 1970). Today, plea bargaining is a standard part of the 
legal system in the United States, accounting for the majority of all criminal convictions (Bibas, 
2003; United State Sentencing Commission, 2017).   
In general, a plea deal is an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant in which 
the defendant is offered leniency in exchange for admitting guilt (Alschuler, 1979). This leniency 
generally takes the form of either charge bargaining—in which the initial charges are reduced or 
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even dropped, or sentence bargaining—in which the sentence gets reduced in exchange for a 
guilty plea and a trial waiver (Saltzburg & Capra, 2004). However, defendants can also enter 
open pleas. This refers to when the defendant pled guilty without an agreement of charge or 
sentence bargaining, and the eventual sentence is solely determined by the judge (Ellis & 
Allenbaugh, 2017). Regardless of the type of plea, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states 
that it is ultimately the judge’s choice to accept or reject a defendant’s plea. 
History of Alford Pleas 
 Alongside the Brady (1970) case that legitimized traditional plea bargaining, the Alford 
plea became an accepted practice through the court’s decision in the case North Carolina v. 
Alford in 1970. In 1963 in North Carolina, Henry C. Alford was accused of first-degree murder. 
Alford had reportedly gotten into an altercation with the victim, Nathanial Young, at a bar earlier 
that night. Later, Young was shot, killed, and Alford was promptly arrested. There were no 
witnesses to the actual crime, but Alford’s neighbor claimed that Alford had returned home right 
before the murder to retrieve his gun, stated his intention to murder Young, and later returned and 
asserted that he had committed the murder. This witness’s testimony provided strong evidence of 
Alford’s guilt and, as Alford was a Black man with a criminal record in the South in the 1960s, 
his conviction was almost guaranteed (Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009). But at Alford’s arraignment, 
he claimed he was innocent of the crime but was pleading guilty in fear of the death penalty 
(North Carolina v. Alford, 1970). Despite Alford’s persistence in claiming his innocence, the 
judge overseeing the case allowed him to enter a plea of guilty and Alford was sentenced to the 
maximum 30 years in prison for second degree murder. Following the conviction Alford 
repeatedly sought relief, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually reversed his 
conviction. In 1970, the Supreme Court re-affirmed Alford’s conviction in a six-to-three decision 
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which declared that, of the two conditions to pleading guilty—waiving one’s right to trial and 
admission of guilt—it is only the first condition that constitutes a “constitutional requisite to 
imposing a criminal sanction” (North Carolina v. Alford, 1970). 
Following this landmark decision, the Alford plea was established. Defendants can now 
legally plead guilty and receive leniency without the requirement of admitting guilt (Redlich & 
Özdoğru, 2009). As with traditional guilty pleas, however, the defendant is still required to waive 
several rights, including the right to trial, the right to appeal, and the opportunity to engage in 
civil litigation against the state (Schneider, 2013). Unlike the no contest (or nolo contendere) 
plea, defendants who accept Alford pleas are still subject to future civil litigation against them 
(Shipley, 1987).  
The Alford plea is legally the same as a traditional plea, with the only difference being the 
opportunity to maintain innocence. Zottoli et al. (2019) reported that while the Alford plea is only 
explicitly allowed in six states, it is used in 47 states today. Anecdotal data from a former federal 
prosecutor suggests that the Alford plea is the most common method of resolving pleas in 
Connecticut (Potts, 2009), and defense attorneys in North Carolina suggest that Alford pleas are 
commonplace in state courts in that state (Welty, 2010). Using the Survey of Inmates in State and 
Federal Correctional Facilities, Wolf Harlow (2000) reported an estimated 6% of state inmates 
and 3% of federal inmates in 1997 entered Alford pleas. Similar numbers were found by Redlich 
and Özdoğru, (2009) who examined the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Survey of Inmates in State 
Correctional Facilities (SISCF) from 2004 and found that 6.5% of state inmates had entered an 
Alford plea. Given that merely 3% of criminal cases go to trial (United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2017), the data suggests that Alford pleas are in fact more common than a trial by 
jury. Legal scholars argue that an Alford plea may be particularly appealing to innocent 
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defendants and may therefore be exacerbating the innocence problem (Bibas, 2003). The 
following section examines the causes and consequences of this issue.  
The Innocence Problem in Plea Bargaining 
As plea bargaining grew in popularity and the majority of cases were being resolved 
outside the court room, a concern quickly arose regarding the risk of innocent defendants 
choosing to plead guilty to a crime to receive reduced charges, rather than facing the risk of going 
to trial where they may be subject to far harsher punishments (Bibas, 2004). In the plea-
bargaining literature, this has been dubbed “the innocence problem”. Redlich, Bibas et al., (2017) 
argue that the plea-bargaining process incentivizes defendants to accept plea deals, even if they 
are innocent. Studies have shown that the “plea discount”—the degree to which a defendant’s 
sentence gets decreased if they accept a plea rather than go to trial – can be as large as 96% 
(Dezember & Redlich, 2019; see Zottoli et al., 2016 for juveniles). In addition, legal scholars 
have identified a trial penalty such that defendants who reject a plea and choose to go to trial are 
generally subject to more severe sentences than defendants who were offered no plea and went to 
trial (Grossman, 2018). As such, legal scholars and psychologists argue that any rational, risk-
averse defendant would thus be better off with a plea.  
Although an extensive body of research has established that false confessions occur with 
regularity in the criminal justice system (Kassin et al., 2010)—and that these confessions 
increased the tendency to plead guilty (Kassin et al., 2012; Redlich et al., 2018), researchers have 
only recently started discussing the innocence problem within plea bargaining. Experimental 
studies have shown that innocent participants will agree to a plea deal—admitting guilt in 
exchange for a lesser charge – at rates as high as 56% (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). Of course, it is 
difficult to know the rate of false guilty pleas outside the laboratory; however, records from 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  9 
 
National Registry of Exonerations (2020) reveal that about 20% of wrongfully convicted 
individuals in the United States chose to falsely plead guilty rather than face the uncertainty and 
risk of a trial.  
Gross et al., (2005) argue that false guilty pleas may be more prevalent than false 
confessions because defendants in plea bargain proceedings have fewer safeguards allotted to 
them compared to defendants who go to trial and are therefore more vulnerable to wrongful 
convictions that are never exposed. Indeed, the previously mentioned records from The National 
Registry of Exonerations (2020) shows that among exonerated individuals, the prevalence of 
false guilty pleas is higher (20%) than that of false confessions (12%). Additionally, many plea 
deals include waivers of the right to appeal, which means very few defendants who have given a 
false guilty plea even have the opportunity to challenge their conviction (Redlich & Bonventre, 
2015). This suggests that the National Registry of Exoneration statistic of false guilty pleas is 
likely an underestimate and that it is all but impossible to know the true number (Redlich, Bibas, 
et al., 2017). Despite this, some researchers believe that the innocence problem is of limited 
magnitude and thus does not warrant further examination or reform of the system (Tor, Gazal-
Ayal, & Garcia, 2010; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2011). 
The Alford Plea and False Admissions 
Like a false traditional guilty plea, an innocent person’s Alford plea is a false admission 
that leads to a conviction, a criminal record, and potential liability in civil cases (Redlich & 
Özdoğru, 2009; Ward, 2003). The prevalence of innocent defendants accepting Alford pleas is 
even more difficult to surmise compared to traditional guilty pleas, as organizations like The 
Innocence Project and the National Registry of Exonerations do not distinguish Alford pleas from 
traditional pleas or no contest pleas in their records of exonerees. However, legal scholars fear 
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that the innocence problem might be especially common among defendants who enter Alford 
pleas, as they are able to assert their innocence (Bibas, 2003). Some legal scholars argue that in 
the original Alford decision the court condoned or even encouraged other courts to accept pleas 
from defendants who may be innocent (Diehm, 2015).  
For an Alford plea to be allowed, the court must find a sufficient factual basis of guilt; 
however, judges have broad discretion to accept or reject an Alford plea (Redlich & Özdoğru, 
2009). Nonetheless, it has never been established what “sufficient” entails and, consequently, 
judges have accepted or rejected Alford pleas for a variety of reasons with various standards 
underlying their decisions (Shipley, 1987). Although it may be argued that the original Alford 
case contained strong evidence, thus fulfilling the criteria of a sufficient factual basis of guilt, 
there are many examples of cases resolved through Alford pleas in which this was not the case. 
The West Memphis Three is an example of this. Damien Echols, Jessie Misskelley, and 
Jason Baldwin were tried and convicted for the murders of three young boys in 1994 based solely 
on a confession provided by Misskelley (Schneider, 2013). Due to the many inconsistencies in 
Miskelley’s statement and the lack of any corroborating evidence, it became evident to the public 
that the three defendants were innocent, and that the confession was false. After seeking relief for 
many years with the support of numerous celebrities, the three men were advised by their lawyers 
to accept Alford pleas and, in 2011, the West Memphis Three were released from prison (Vota, 
2011). Consistent with research showing that confessions are seen as highly incriminating 
evidence (Kassin, 2012), this case provides a clear example of when a single piece of evidence—
a false confession—was enough for the judge to accept the entered Alford pleas.  
The West Memphis Three and the case of Joseph Buffey mentioned earlier are just two of 
several cases in which defendants have been granted retrials due to uncertainties regarding the 
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validity of the initial trial, only to then be offered an Alford plea with the benefit of getting or 
staying out of prison as a result of time already served (see for example the cases of Leroy Harris 
[innocenceproject.org] and Michael Peterson [Walton, 2019]). It is important to note that by 
accepting Alford pleas, these defendants are still considered guilty and are not eligible for relief 
from the state (Schneider, 2013).  
Additionally, the majority of the Innocence Project’s first 200 exonerees involved 
seemingly strong evidence that later turned out to be erroneous (innocenceproject.org). Most of 
the defendants in these wrongful conviction cases went to trial, where they had the chance to 
contest the evidence against them through the safeguard of the adversarial trial process. Yet, they 
were all convicted. Redlich and Özdoğru (2009) argue that if these cases had been put in front of 
a judge to determine the sufficient factual basis of guilt for an Alford plea, the standard would 
most likely have been met and these defendants would have been allowed to enter an Alford plea, 
despite their actual innocence. Using Wolf Harlow’s (2000) estimation of 6% of inmates entering 
Alford pleas, even if only 1% of these defendants were innocent, that would still amount to 
double the number of Innocence Project exonerations to date (380; Redlich and Özdoğru, 2009). 
Considering this data, legal scholars’ concerns regarding the risk of innocent defendants being 
convicted through Alford pleas are indeed valid and in need of further examination and empirical 
research.  
Disadvantages of the Alford Plea 
 Beyond the potential increased risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty through an 
Alford plea that legal scholars express (Diehm, 2015; Ward, 2003), there are other issues with 
this alternative plea that can affect innocent and guilty defendants alike. Importantly, the primary 
benefits that Alford plea advocates put forth are similar to the benefits of a traditional plea 
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(Schneider, 2013). The defendant receives the advantage of a reduced sentence and avoids the 
risk of trial, without having to claim responsibility for the crime (Ronis, 2009; Walburn, 1998).  
The actual practice of using the Alford plea suggests that these previously mentioned 
benefits are not sufficient to induce the acceptance of the plea offer (Ward, 2003). First and 
foremost, the benefits of avoiding risk and uncertainty are only an illusion when it comes to 
Alford pleas, as there is both risk and uncertainty present in the subsequent sentencing phase 
(Bibas, 2003). Many courts view the defendant’s expression of remorse as an important aspect of 
the sentencing phase (Ward, 2003). This is of course most relevant in cases of open pleas, where 
a set sentence has not yet been decided (Ellis & Allenbaugh, 2017). Remorse is often used as a 
proxy for potential future risk of re-offending (Schneider, 2013), and studies have shown that a 
defendant showing a lack of remorse is more likely to receive a harsher sentence (Harrel, 1981).  
Some states view an expression of remorse as a mitigating factor and may, as a 
consequence, reduce the defendant’s sentence. Yet other states view the lack of remorse as an 
aggravating factor, enhancing the severity of a defendant’s sentence if he or she does not express 
sincere remorse (Ward, 2003). In a study aimed at examining judges’ perceptions of remorse, 
Wood and McMartin (2007) found that judges deemed a plea of guilty as comparable to an 
expression of remorse, whereas denial of guilt was the same as a lack of remorse. The issue of 
remorse is self-evident for Alford defendants as they—by their insistence of innocence—do not 
take responsibility for the crime and thus do not meet the standard of remorse. Hence, the 
Supreme Court stated in the original Alford case (North Carolina v. Alford, 1970) that the 
decision does not require the court to treat a defendant who has entered an Alford plea as 
innocent for purposes of sentencing. 
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But the issue of not expressing remorse or taking responsibility goes beyond sentencing. 
Probation often includes conditions such as counseling, anger management, and sex offender 
treatment (Ward, 2003). An important part of many of these programs is the acceptance of 
responsibility. Alford pleaders who maintain their innocence risk getting their probation revoked, 
especially if they are charged with sex offenses. For example, in 2004, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court revoked a defendant’s probation for failure to admit responsibility in a mandated sex 
offender treatment program (State v. Faraday, 2004). The defendant had accepted an Alford plea 
and argued that he had not been informed that refusing to take responsibility could lead to the 
revocation of his probation, since the Alford doctrine had allowed him to maintain innocence. 
The court disagreed and concluded that they were not required to inform the defendant of this 
requirement.  
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin revoked a defendant’s probation for 
failure to admit guilt in sex offender treatment, stating that his Alford plea did not “entitle him to 
special treatment” (State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 1998). Likewise, an incarcerated defendant 
who is up for parole is often expected to express remorse to show the parole board that he or she 
has a low risk of committing any future criminal wrongdoing; however, because Alford pleaders 
maintain their innocence, they risk being denied parole due to this stance (Medwed, 2008). 
Molesworth (2008) argued that a defendant who refuses to accept responsibility may also 
harm the victim, as acknowledgements of guilt and remorse are crucial to a victim’s recovery. As 
such, there are significant negative consequences of the Alford plea resulting from innocent and 
guilty defendants alike. Defendants who use the Alford plea may thus be mistreated both in the 
criminal justice system, where their refusal to admit guilt may lead to revoked probation or 
denied parole (Ward, 2003), and in the community, where the public may view an Alford plea as 
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a defendant refusing to admit his guilt and, consequently, denying victims the recovery that 
comes with closure (Schneider, 2013). 
Additionally, there is the issue of wrongfully convicted defendants coaxed into accepting 
an Alford plea by prosecutors as a way to avoid a re-trial, as in the case of Joe Buffey and the 
West Memphis Three described earlier. While an Alford plea enables these defendants to claim 
innocence, it is not an exoneration and as such, these wrongfully convicted defendants still have 
criminal records and are not entitled to compensation from the state (Schneider, 2013).  
Reasoning Behind False Pleas 
With so many negative effects stemming from making a false admission in the form of a 
false guilty plea, why would any defendant choose this course of action? In trying to understand 
the decision-making process in a plea bargain context, legal scholars and social science 
researchers have traditionally used the shadow-of-the-trial model (Bibas, 2004). Psychologists 
argue that a plea deal will almost always be more appealing to most defendants, not only due to a 
reduced sentence (Zottoli et al., 2016) but also in contrast to the uncertainty that accompanies the 
choice of going to trial (Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014). But the shadow-of-the-trial model 
has been subject to little empirical testing, and critics argue the model is much too simplistic, 
failing to take factors such as innocence vs. guilt and the influence of counsel into account 
(Bibas, 2004). Bibas further discusses how defendants can be persuaded into accepting a plea due 
to anchoring effects produced by multiple offers. As a part of the bargaining process, prosecutors 
often present an initial offer with a severe sentence, with subsequent offers being more and more 
lenient (Miller, 2013). Thus, the later offers will be more appealing to defendants who compare it 
to the initial, often unreasonable offer.  
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Another obvious factor that can influence plea-bargaining which is not taken into account 
in the shadow-of-the-trial model is the race of the defendant (Bibas, 2004). Research has shown 
that Black defendants are more likely to be offered pleas to their top charges and that lead to 
incarceration compared to White defendants (Kutateladze, Andiloro & Johnson, 2014). Studies 
have shown that Black defendants are also more likely to take their cases to trial compared to 
White defendants, as a consequence of less appealing plea offers and a general distrust in the 
system (Lee & Richardson, 2020). As such, race can be viewed as an additional risk factor that 
needs to be taken into account when making a plea decision (Redlich, Bibas, et al., 2017). 
Moreover, recent research has shown that the defendant’s access to information about 
collateral consequences can also influence the decision-making process (Gordon & Hellgren, 
2020). The Supreme Court has stated that defendants are legally required to be advised about 
potential direct consequences (e.g., jail time, fines) to make a fully informed choice (Brady v. 
United States, 1970), but defendants are not required to be informed about the several rights and 
benefits they may lose as a result of a criminal conviction. The Brady decision’s exclusion of any 
requirement to make defendants aware of collateral consequences (e.g., government benefits, 
housing, voting rights) implies that they are perceived to be less influential on a defendant’s plea 
decisions compared to direct consequences. However, Gordon & Hellgren (2020) found that 
defendants who were informed about collateral consequences—particularly consequences that 
were personally relevant to them—were significantly less likely to accept a plea deal than 
participants who were unaware of any collateral consequences.  
Examining individual differences that influence the decision making of defendants in plea 
bargaining, Redlich et al. (2010) found that 36% of their sample (mentally ill defendants) self-
reported that they had accepted a plea despite being innocent. Of these respondents, 29% further 
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reported that they did so because the risk of being convicted and getting a harsher sentence at trial 
was too high. Similarly, Malloy et al. (2014) found that 18% of their sample of adolescent 
defendants self-reported having pled guilty despite being innocent. The primary reason for 
choosing to falsely plead guilty was to reduce their sentences, something more than half of the 
respondents stated as their reason. This reasoning lends some credence to the shadow-of-the-trial 
model, however, both Redlich and Malloy’s respondents reported that in addition to wanting to 
reduce their sentences, they were also heavily influenced by pressure from their lawyers to falsely 
plead guilty.  
 In the only empirical study of this topic, Redlich and Özdoğru (2009) examined the 
characteristics of defendants accepting Alford pleas. Using the Department of Justice’s 2004 
State Survey of Inmates in Correctional Facilities, the authors aimed to describe and compare 
these inmates to inmates who had taken other types of pleas, such as no contest pleas, traditional 
guilty pleas, and not guilty pleas. They found that 6.5% of state inmates had accepted Alford 
pleas, and within the three types of guilty pleas described above, Alford pleas accounted for 
8.5%. They found few differences between characteristics and legal factors of defendants 
entering an Alford plea compared to a conventional type of plea. Redlich and Özdoğru (2009) 
further found that 50% of defendants who had chosen an Alford plea were charged with violent 
crimes, such as murder and sexual assault. The Alford defendants were two times more likely 
than the average defendant to be charged with murder. Schneider (2013) argues that it is 
important to look at this breakdown of charges as defendants charged with serious, violent crimes 
are more likely to enter Alford pleas compared to average defendants, for two reasons. First, 
violent crimes like murder and sexual assault come with longer, harsher sentences, which may 
make a defendant more willing to opt for a plea compared to other defendants. Second, because 
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crimes of this nature are associated with strong negative reactions from the public, a defendant 
who has committed such a crime might be less likely to want to admit guilt, both for reasons of 
self-preservation and fear of the public’s judgement.  
The Stigma of False Admissions 
Defendants who make false admissions, be it a confession to police or a guilty plea in 
court, are often stigmatized by the public (Kukucka & Evolo, 2018). False admissions are 
counterintuitive and difficult for the general public to understand (Kassin, 2017; White, 2003), 
and many people claim they would never admit to something they did not do (Henkel et al., 
2008; Kassin, 2012). Researchers have shown that people tend to commit the fundamental 
attribution error (FAE) when assessing false confessions as they make dispositional attributions 
to others’ words and actions and fail to take external situational factors into account (Kassin, 
1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; for overviews of basic research on the FAE, see Gilbert & Malone, 
1995; Ross, 1977). In addition, actor-observer effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) supports the idea of 
observers making internal attributions to others’ behaviors, and further adds the notion that actors 
tend to attribute their own thoughts and actions to external factors and situations.  
As a consequence of these biases, the public (and some courts) disregard the impact of 
external factors when wrongfully convicted individuals are exonerated and believe that if that 
individual gave a false confession, it was their choice, and they are responsible for their own 
wrongful conviction (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019). They are therefore seen as less deserving of 
assistance to reintegrate into society (Scherr et al., 2018) and financial compensation (Kukucka & 
Evelo, 2019). Studies have also shown that the public is more likely to make dispositional 
judgements about false confessors compared to other exonerees, judging them to be less 
intelligent and discounting the effect of coercive interrogation techniques (Henkel et al., 2008; 
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Scherr et al., 2018). Moreover, the public is likely to believe that exonerated defendants are still 
guilty if they gave a false confession, even if they later recanted (Clow & Leach, 2015).  
Recent research has suggested that these stigmatizing effects also apply to individuals 
who have provided false admissions in the forms of false guilty pleas (Scherr et al., 2020). 
Although legal scholars argue that Alford defendants preserve their reputation by maintaining 
innocence, the question remains whether they would in fact be perceived differently than 
defendants accepting traditional guilty pleas. In a recent study, participants were presented with a 
description of a criminal case, based on the case of Joseph Buffey, in which a defendant was 
accused of burglary and sexual assault but insisted on his innocence (Hellgren & Kassin, 2018). 
The defendant then either accepted a traditional plea, an Alford plea, or chose to go to trial. The 
results suggested that Alford pleaders are perceived as less guilty than traditional guilty pleaders, 
but more guilty than defendants who choose to go to trial. In sum, individuals make false 
admissions for several reasons, including wanting reduced sentences and succumbing to pressure 
from attorneys. In contrast, research on Alford pleas suggests that the reason behind the decision 
may lay in wanting to preserve one’s reputation by proclaiming innocence (Redlich and Özdoğru, 
2009; Schneider, 2013).  
Given the research reviewed above, it may be the case that an Alford plea offers a 
compromise for innocent defendants who may not accept a traditional plea that requires them to 
admit guilt and thus face stigma. In the following section, I will explore and lay a foundation for 
how social psychology theories can shed more light on the decision-making process in an Alford 
plea context.  
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Psychological Bases of Alford Pleas 
The sole difference between an Alford plea and a traditional guilty plea is the ability for 
defendants to maintain innocence, the perceived benefits of which could appeal to innocent and 
guilty defendants alike (Ronis, 2009). Although this has not been empirically tested, classic social 
psychology literature lends some support for this notion by asserting humans’ dual needs for 
positive self-regard and positive regard by others (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). 
Compliance and The Need to Belong  
Research on both confessions and plea bargaining has shown than compliance to an 
authority figure is a strong motivating factor for innocent defendants to falsely admit guilt to police, 
attorneys, and judges (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Redlich, Bibas et al. 2017). The need to belong and 
to be liked by others is one of the most fundamental tenets of social psychology (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Humans are social animals and are highly driven by the desire to be accepted by 
others and included in social groups. The need to belong is an important basis for our sense of self-
worth and self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995). Conversely, people fear being neglected, rejected, and 
ostracized (Williams et al., 2000). 
These desires can influence people to conform and comply with others in order to not stand 
out (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The classic Milgram studies (1974) illustrated how nearly two-
thirds of people complied with a request to administer an ostensibly harmful electric shock to 
another, merely because an authority figure told them to do so. More recent replication studies have 
shown similar rates of compliance (Burger, 2009). Social pressure to comply with authority figures 
is highly relevant in a plea-bargaining context. Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are all 
authority figures who defendants perceive to have more knowledge and power than them (Redlich 
et al., 2017). The principle of authority along with the need to belong, which creates a natural 
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tendency to conform and comply, makes the probability of a defendant accepting a plea offer high 
(Bordens & Basset, 1985; Redlich, Bibas et al., 2017).  
Research has further shown that committing transgressions that induce feelings of guilt 
leads to a higher probability of compliance due to the desire to repair the perceived harm done 
(Boster et al., 2016). Interestingly, Cardenas and colleagues (2020) found that participants who had 
committed a transgression and were then accused of a transgression they had not committed felt 
similar feelings of guilt and pled guilty at similar rates as completely guilty participants, but not as 
innocent participants. This result implies that if an individual is induced to feel guilty, even for 
actions they did not commit, they are more likely to comply with others’ requests.  
Dissonance Reduction Through Self-Affirmation  
Even if the need to belong drives an innocent defendant to accept a plea, the requirement 
to admit guilt may lead them to experience cognitive dissonance—a negative state of arousal 
stemming from behaving counter to one’s beliefs (Festinger, 1957).  
In a classic experiment, Festinger & Carlsmith (1959) found that participants who were 
asked to lie and tell another participant that a tedious task they just took part in was entertaining 
were motivated to change their belief and later report the task as actually enjoyable. However, 
participants who were paid to lie were offered enough justification to not warrant an attitude 
change. Later research on dissonance reduction suggested that it was not the psychological 
inconsistency per se that motivated an attitude change or justification, but the effect the 
inconsistency had on the individual’s self-view (Aronson, 1999: Steele & Liu, 1983). Aronson 
(1990) asserts that our thoughts and actions are driven by the need to view ourselves as moral, good 
people and any threat to that self-concept leads to psychological tension and a motivation to either 
change our attitudes or to justify and rationalize our behavior (Aronson et al., 2019). 
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Following upon self-based theories of cognitive dissonance, Steele (1988) found that 
allowing someone to self-affirm values that were consistent with their self-concept after a 
dissonance-activating act reduced the dissonance and the motivation to change their attitude. In 
essence, the premise of self-affirmation theory is that that dissonance can threaten a person’s self-
integrity and their view of themselves as a good and moral person (Steele & Liu, 1983). By 
enhancing one’s positive self-regard through self-affirmation, the individual’s focus will be on 
factors that enhance their self-concept rather than the threat to their self-integrity, which reduces 
their psychological discomfort.  
Applied to the Alford plea, defendants may experience cognitive dissonance because of the 
threat to self that is elicited through an accusation followed by a plea offer that requires the 
admission of guilt. By self-affirming one’s innocence through accepting an Alford plea, innocent 
defendants may experience a dissonance reduction. Findings by Landau and Greenberg (2006) 
support this idea. By combining theories of self-affirmation and terror management—the theory 
that self-esteem protects people from the anxiety aroused by ones’ own mortality (Greenberg et al., 
1992)—they found that participants who were able to self-affirm were less likely to partake in risky 
decision making. This may explain why a defendant would be more likely to accept an Alford plea 
which enables them to self-affirm innocence and then choose the less risky option of accepting a 
deal, compared to a traditional guilty plea that gives no chance for self-affirmation, or a trial that 
is too risky. 
Self-Presentation and the Alford Plea 
In addition to the motivation to self-affirm to protect one’s self-concept, psychologists 
have found that people are motivated to self-present in ways that protect their self-view and self-
esteem (Vohs et al., 2005). Because humans have a basic need for acceptance and social 
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approval, they are generally motivated to present themselves in positive ways to other people 
(Schlenker, 1975). There are two types of self-presentation: strategic self-presentation and self-
verification (Vohs et al., 2005). Strategic self-presentation refers to when an individual is 
motivated to self-present in a positive, socially desirable manner to fit in and gain social 
acceptance, even if that self-presentation does not reflect the individual’s self-concept (Jones & 
Pittman, 1982). Individuals who employ strategic self-presentation flexibly adapt to different 
social situations and enhance whichever part of them that is most likely to lead to social 
acceptance in each separate context (Goffman, 1959). 
Alternatively, people also self-present through self-verification, which occurs when an 
individual is highly motivated to present in a way that is consistent with their self-view, and have 
others verify this view (Swann et al., 1987). Swann and colleagues have consistently found that 
individuals prefer others whose perceptions of them are consistent with their own self-
perceptions (Swann et al., 1987; Swann, 2012) Self-verification by others has been found to 
enhance the quality of relationships, reduce anxiety and psychological discomfort, and improve 
physical health (Shimizu & Pelham, 2004; Swann, 2012). Research has further shown that if an 
individual is perceived by others in a way that is inconsistent with their self-concept, they will 
fervently exaggerate their self-presentation to change that perception (Swann & Hill, 1982).  
In the false confession literature, laboratory research suggests that guilty participants 
generally use strategic self-presentation to avoid suspicion by police (Kassin & Norwick, 2004). 
Kassin and Norwick found that guilty participants fearing suspicion overwhelmingly reported 
self-presentational reasons behind the decision to waive rather than invoke their Miranda rights. 
In addition, several studies comparing guilty and innocent suspects in an interrogation setting 
have found support for the idea that guilty suspects use strategic self-presentational tactics to 
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appear innocent to the police (Clemens & Grolig, 2019; Hines et al., 2009). In terms of Alford 
defendants, guilty defendants may similarly use strategic self-presentation to appear innocent and 
preserve their reputation, which some legal scholars argue is one of the primary benefits of the 
Alford plea (Ronis, 2009; Schneider, 2013). 
For innocent defendants, self-verification may help explain why innocent defendants who 
would not accept a traditional plea potentially find an Alford plea appealing: by maintaining their 
innocence, they are self-presenting in a manner consistent with their self-concept, while at the 
same time reaping the benefits of a plea discount and avoiding the risk of trial.  
For innocent suspects, an Alford plea could offer a compromise: accepting a deal to benefit 
from the discount and avoiding the risk and potentially harsh consequences of trial, and at the same 
time enhancing self-affirmation and positive self-presentation by maintaining innocence. As such, 
an Alford plea allows a defendant, in theory, to both comply with an authority figure and to 
maintain a positive self-concept through self-affirmation and self-verification. The current program 
of research examined these ideas by drawing from basic social psychology literature to demonstrate 
how theories of self-affirmation and self-presentation could explain the appeal of Alford pleas, 
especially for innocent defendants who might not accept a traditional plea.  
False Admissions Research Methodology 
Studying false admissions and plea bargaining is complicated because field studies often 
lack ground truth, and laboratory studies necessarily lack some realism (Redlich et al. 2017).  
The earliest studies on plea bargaining utilized hypothetical vignettes, asking participants 
to imagine themselves in a situation and to report what their behavior would be (Bordens, 1984; 
Gregory et al. 1978). For example, Gregory and colleagues asked male college students to 
imagine they were either guilty or innocent of an armed robbery. They were then presented with 
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written details about the crime, the evidence and charges against them, and a plea offer. 
Similarly, Bordens (1984) presented participants with a crime vignette and asked participants to 
imagine being guilty or innocent of a crime and presented them with evidence and conviction 
likelihood ratings. Researchers today also use the hypothetical vignette methodology, and despite 
allegedly lacking in realism, find rates of false guilty pleas similar to those in the field (20%; 
Redlich et al. 2017; Tor et al. 2010). 
It is widely known that there are differences between what people self-report they would 
do and how they would feel and what actually occurs (Poon, Koehler, & Buehler, 2014; Wilson 
& Gilbert, 2003). Hence, Russano et al. (2005) set out to develop a novel cheating paradigm that 
increased the stakes for participants. This paradigm has enabled researchers to ethically explore 
processes of decision making by manipulating participants to morally transgress by cheating on 
an experimental task. In this paradigm, a participant is invited into the lab under the pretense of 
taking part in a study on problem solving. The participant collaborates with a second student who 
is in fact a confederate working with the experimenter. The confederate induces the participant to 
cheat by asking for help on the tasks, which violates clearly stated rules not to collaborate. The 
participant is then accused of cheating. The original paradigm explored how interrogation 
techniques influenced participants willingness to confess. More recent studies have used 
somewhat altered versions of this paradigm to examine other problematic issues in the criminal 
justice system such as the bluff tactic of interrogation (Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Wilford & Wells, 
2018), pre-interrogation decision making and Miranda waivers (Scherr et al. 2016) and plea 
bargaining (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Wilford, Wells, & Frazier, 2020).  
One common critique of the cheating paradigm is that the stakes of facing the academic 
integrity board and community service is not equivalent to the risk of facing trial and prison time 
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(Redlich et al., 2017; Wilford & Wells, 2018). Although hypothetical vignette studies add higher 
stakes, this is done at the expense of mundane realism; the extent to which the experiment 
mimics the real-world situation (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). Some researchers thus suggest 
using elements from both types of methodologies (Redlich et al., 2017). 
The original plan for the current project was to employ the cheating paradigm, but as the 
COVID-19 pandemic began, changes had to be made. Instead of simply moving to an online 
crime vignette, I decided to use both a vignette version of the cheating paradigm as well as a 
crime vignette. In addition to exploring the Alford plea with these methods, this approach also 
enabled me to compare how the different stakes of a cheating accusation and a crime accusation 
influence the results. Furthermore, research on vignette methodology suggests that making 
vignettes relevant to participants improve results (Hughes, 1998). To maximize relevance for 
participants, therefore, students were recruited for the studies employing the cheating vignette 
and nonstudent adults were recruited to imagine themselves in the crime vignette.  
Overview of Research 
The present research consisted of five studies aimed at filling a crucial gap in the 
empirical literature by examining two important questions pertaining to the understudied Alford 
plea: (1) Will defendants who may not otherwise accept a conventional plea be persuaded to 
accept an Alford plea? (2) How are Alford pleaders perceived by observers? Does maintaining 
innocence allow them to avoid lasting negative judgment from the public, or does not taking 
responsibility for the crime make them seem more reprehensible? 
Study 1 utilized a vignette, role-playing variation of the laboratory cheating paradigm to 
examine whether participants’ plea decisions were influenced by the Alford plea option. In Study 
1, a 2 (Guilt status: guilt vs innocence) x 2 (Type of Plea: traditional plea vs Alford plea) design 
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was employed. Student participants were recruited from SONA and Prolific and directed to a 
Qualtrics survey. They were asked to imagine that they were taking part of a psychology study at 
their university in which they were to complete a series of problem-solving tasks, both 
individually and in pairs with another participant. Participants read about how a second student 
induced them to cheat by asking for help on an individual task, a clear violation of the 
experimenter’s rules. By random assignment, participants were then told that they either cheated 
by helping the other student or did not cheat by refusing her request. The experimenter then 
accused all participants of cheating after completion of the tasks. At that point, the participant 
was offered either a traditional plea deal (which involved 40 hours of community service) or an 
Alford plea (the same community service with the added benefit of being able to maintain 
innocence). Finally, participants were asked to provide their reasoning behind their decision-
making process.  
Study 2 sought to replicate and extend the first study by using the same role-playing 
vignette procedure and design. In this study, however, participants were asked to imagine being 
accused of a crime (involuntary manslaughter) and then offered either a traditional plea (six 
months in jail) or Alford plea (six months in jail and the ability to maintain innocence). The same 
questions regarding participants’ decision-making process were asked.  
Consistent with past research, I hypothesized that guilty participants would be more likely 
to accept a plea compared to innocent participants overall. In addition, however, I predicted that 
this difference would diminish in the Alford condition because of an increase in innocents who 
were willing to accept that plea. I further predicted that these participants would later cite social 
and self-presentation concerns and the belief that maintaining innocence despite accepting the 
plea would make them seem more innocent to others as the reasons for accepting an Alford plea. 
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 In Studies 3 and 4, my aim was to examine observers’ perceptions of the Alford plea. In 
Study 3, Prolific participants in a 2 (Type of plea: traditional vs Alford) x 2 (Plea decision: accept 
vs reject) between subjects design read about a male student going through the cheating paradigm 
procedure described in Study 1, in which the student either accepted or rejected the deal offered 
by the experimenter. Participants then provided their guilt perceptions of the student they read 
about along with their perceptions of his decision and character. This was done with the purpose 
of exploring how Alford pleaders and their decisions were perceived by observers.  
Similarly, Study 4 sought to replicate Study 3, using the same procedure and design. In 
Study 3 participants read a vignette based on the scenario used in Study 2, describing a man 
being accused of a crime, being offered a plea deal (traditional vs Alford), and then giving a plea 
decision (accept vs reject). Participants’ perceptions of the man and his plea decision were then 
explored.  
Study 5 used a similar design to Study 4 but further explored how a defendant who 
initiated an Alford plea by their own request was perceived differently from defendants to whom 
it was offered without request. I hypothesized that participants would rate the defendant more 
favorably (and perceive him as less guilty) when he chose to reject the plea and when he initiated 
an Alford plea via a request to the prosecutor compared to if he accepted a traditional plea.    
Study 1  
Method 
Participants 
Because the majority of analyses conducted were factorial ANOVAs, I conducted an a 
priori power analysis for a factorial ANOVA and found that a minimum of 351 participants 
should be adequate to detect a medium to small effect size (f = 0.15, α = 0.80, p = 0.05; Faul et 
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al., 2007). The chosen effect size was a compromise between previous plea-bargaining research 
(Henderson & Levett, 2018) and what was feasible for the current project. Participants were 
oversampled by 10% to account for participant loss due to failed manipulation or attention 
checks. Students were used as participants to enhance the probability that they could immerse 
themselves in the study’s vignette. 
Initially, student participants were recruited through the SONA Research Experience 
system (hereafter SONA). But as recruitment was slow and the data of low quality, I collected the 
rest of the data from Prolific. Prolific is a crowdsourcing platform aimed primarily at academic 
research and has been found to have a more attentive and diverse participant pool compared to 
other online research platforms, such as Mechanical Turk (Peer et al., 2017). Prolific participants 
were screened to ensure that they were college students to match the SONA sample.  
Data were collected from a total of 460 participants: 117 from SONA and 332 from 
Prolific. 52 participants were removed from the SONA sample for failing more than two attention 
and/or manipulation checks (these checks will be discussed later). In the Prolific sample, 10 
participants were removed for failing two or more attention and/or manipulation checks. Thus, 
the final sample consisted of 391 participants, 82.4% from Prolific and the remaining 17.6% from 
SONA.  
Participants were adult US citizens and ranged in age from 18 to 71, with a mean age of 
22.5 (SD = 5.83). Overall, 217 were female, 155 male, 16 non-binary, and 3 preferred not to 
report their gender. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the participants was as follows: 
White/European American (46.3%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander (20.7%), 
Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country (16.4%), African American/Black (11%), 
Biracial/Multiracial (3.8%), Middle Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (1%), Native 
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American/American Indian/Indigenous (n = 2, .5%) and Other (specified as West Indian, n = 1, 
.3%). The sample consisted of 22.8% Freshman, 21.3% Sophomores, 29.3% Juniors, and 26.7% 
Seniors, and participants represented 45 states. Only 8.5% reported having been arrested, and 
26.1% reported having a family member who had been arrested (8.7% said they did not know). 
No participants reported working in a legal profession, but 14.8% had family members who did 
(lawyers, police officers, and correction officers). Demographic variables were evenly dispersed 
across conditions (see Table 1).1 
Prolific participants were compensated with $1.78 for their time; the SONA sample 
received class credit for their participation.  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions produced by a 2 (Guilt 
Status: guilty vs. innocent) x 2 (Type of Plea: traditional vs. Alford) between-subjects design. 
Guilt status was manipulated by asking them to imagine having assisted in cheating, or not. Type 
of plea was manipulated by which plea was offered to them by the experimenter in the vignette.  
Study Materials and Procedure  
Both SONA and Prolific participants were directed to an online Qualtrics survey. After 
completing informed consent, participants were asked to read the following verbatim vignette2: 
The Set Up and the Crime. You attend a public university and you’ve signed up for a 
study, for course credit, titled “Individual and Group Problem Solving.” 
You schedule an appointment and when you arrive at the waiting area of a psychology 
laboratory, you are met by a female experimenter and a fellow student, someone you don’t know. 
The two of you are taken to a room inside, furnished with two tables and two chairs, and the 
 
1 Though not presented in tables, this was also true for the four subsequent studies.  
2 All vignettes were at a 6th grade reading level, according to the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test. 
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experimenter explains that you will be asked to complete a series of questions modeled after the 
TV show Family Feud. You’ll be asked to answer some questions individually, some as a team. 
For the joint task, you are told to work together and discuss the categories; for the individual part, 
you are told to not talk to the other participants and solve the task on your own. 
The study seems straightforward. The experimenter hands you each an “individual” 
question for Round 1, leaves the room, then returns when the time is up. Then she hands you 
each the “group” question for Round 2, and leaves. This time you discuss with the other student 
and you work together to come up with answers. The experimenter then returns when the time is 
up. These first couple of rounds pass uneventfully.  
During ROUND 3, the other student asks you for help on an individual task. “I’m 
blanking out,” she says. “Can you help me?”  
Guilty Condition. If participants were assigned to the guilty condition, they read the 
following: Imagine yourself in that situation. You know it’s against the experimenter’s protocol 
to collaborate on an individual problem. But your fellow student asked. It’s a tough spot. In this 
case, you decide to “cheat” by helping the other student with answers in violation of the 
experimenter’s protocol. 
Innocent Condition. If participants were assigned to the innocent condition, they instead 
read the following: Imagine yourself in that situation. You know it’s against the experimenter’s 
protocol to collaborate on an individual problem. But your fellow student asked. It’s a tough spot. 
You are tempted to help but, in this case, you respect the experimenter’s rule and you keep your 
answers to yourself. 
The Problem. The experimenter collects Round 3, hands you both Round 4, and leaves. 
One minute later, she returns and says to you both: “We have a problem. It looks like you cheated 
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by working together on an individual problem set.” At that point, the Experimenter removes the 
other student from the room and says, “I need to talk to both of you and then I need to check with 
my supervisor.” 
The Accusation. You wait alone in the room for fifteen minutes. At that point, the 
experimenter returns and says: “It’s clear to me now that you cheated, that you helped each other 
on an individual problem. I knew I heard voices during Round 3. Plus, the odds of two people 
independently coming up with exactly the same unlikely answers is like less than one percent.  
I talked to my supervisor, the principal investigator of this research. He is very upset. This 
is just the kind of thing that can invalidate the study and make it difficult to get funding in the 
future. 
As far as he is concerned, this act of cheating violates the university’s honor code. He 
wants to take you to the Academic Integrity Board (AIB) for a hearing. It’s like a trial. We will 
present our evidence, you’ll have an opportunity to state your case, and the Board will render a 
verdict (historically they convict about half the students who appear). I’ll be honest: This is 
serious stuff.” 
Then the experimenter says: “I think I talked my supervisor down. If you are willing to 
plead guilty by signing and dating this short form I wrote up, you won’t have to appear for a trial 
before the AIB.” 
Guilty Plea. Participants in the guilty plea condition then read the following: “If you 
plead guilty, it means you admit to cheating and agree to perform forty hours of community 
service at the university. You will take full responsibility for the cheating and the data loss it 
caused. In exchange, he won’t file charges against you. The plea will go on the university’s 
internal record. Once you’ve served the time, you’re done. If you do not accept the plea offer, you 
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will be scheduled for a hearing at the university within the next few weeks. The AIB will then 
render a verdict. If they find you guilty, they will determine what larger punishment is 
appropriate.” 
Alford Plea. Participants in the Alford plea condition instead read the following: “If you 
plead guilty, it means you agree to perform forty hours of community service at the university. In 
exchange, he won’t file charges against you. The plea will go on the university’s internal record. 
Once you’ve served the time, you’re done.” Then the experimenter adds: “If you want, you can 
also handwrite a personal statement on the agreement that while you accept the plea and its terms, 
you are, in fact, innocent and did not cheat. That statement would become part of the file. This 
means that you would not have to take responsibility or admit guilt for cheating. If you do not 
accept the plea offer, you will be scheduled for a hearing at the university within the next few 
weeks. The AIB will then render a verdict. If they find you guilty, they will determine what 
larger punishment is appropriate.”  
Once participants had read through the scenario, they were presented with a series of 
questions aimed at examining their decision-making process. They were as follows: 
Dependent Measures  
Plea Decision. The primary dependent variable was the final dichotomous plea decision 
(accept or reject) that the participant made. Participants were also asked to provide their level of 
confidence in this decision, where 1 was Not at all, and 10 was Very. 
Reasoning Behind Plea Decision. Across conditions, participants were prompted to 
provide their reasoning behind the final plea decision they made. This was an open-ended 
question and participants’ responses were coded. The coding had two aims: (1) to look 
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specifically for mentions of the ability to maintain innocence and concerns about other’s 
perceptions of their guilt, and (2) explore other common themes more broadly. 
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. To further evaluate how the predicted perception of the 
participants influenced their plea decision, they were asked to estimate how many out of 100 
observers watching them make their decision would believe they cheated. 
Post-Plea State of Mind. To explore how the plea decision affected their state of mind, 
participants were asked to rate how confident they are that they made the right decision (1 = Very 
confident to 10 = Not at all confident); how difficult the decision was to make (1 = Very difficult 
to 7 = Not at all difficult); and how satisfied they are with their decision (1 = Not at all satisfied 
to 10 = Very satisfied), and how much pressure they felt when they were offered a deal (1 = None 
to 10 = A great deal). 
Case Evaluation. Participants then evaluated a number of aspects of the case. 
Specifically, they were asked to rate the seriousness of the wrongdoing (the cheating) they were 
accused of (1 = Not at all to 10 = Very), how strong the evidence of them cheating was (1 = Not 
at all to 10 = Very), and how likely they were to be convicted by the Academic Integrity Board (1 
-100). 
Consequences of Decision. Next, to explore how the potential consequences of the plea 
influenced their decision making, participants were asked to rate to what extent their plea 
decision was influenced by the consequences of rejecting the deal (facing the AIB; 1 = Very 
much to 10 = Not at all); and the consequences of accepting the deal (community service; 1 = 
Very much to 10 = Not at all). For the Alford plea condition, participants were asked how 
influenced they were by the opportunity to maintain their innocence (1 = Very much to 10 = Not 
at all; see Appendix A for full questionnaire). 
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Attention and Manipulation Checks. Participants received several questions throughout 
the survey with the purpose to examine whether they were paying attention and understanding the 
manipulation.  
Instructional Manipulation Check. Participants completed an instruction manipulation 
check, meant to ensure participants were paying attention to instructions (IMC; Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). This type of attention check is used regularly in online research 
(Peer et al., 2014). The exact question read as follows: 
“Given that this study is examining your decision-making process, it is important to us 
that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show us that you are, please choose 
"Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”  
Manipulation Check. To ensure that participants noticed and appreciated that an Alford 
plea enabled them to maintain innocence, they were asked to respond to the following True or 
False question: “The plea I was offered required me to admit guilt and accept responsibility for 
the cheating.”3 
Participants were also asked whether they cheated or not to ensure they were aware of 
their own guilt status. Finally, as a combined attention and manipulation check, they were asked 
to provide the final “sentence” they were offered (40 community service hours). Participants who 
failed two or more checks were ultimately removed from analyses.  
Hypotheses 
 
3 Ultimately, this manipulation check was not used as the majority of participants across the five studies failed it, 
particularly in Alford conditions. I conducted a follow-up study to compare this manipulation check to one that was 
more specifically worded (“The plea Michael was offered enabled him to claim innocence while accepting the 
plea”). I found that while 59% of participants in this additional sample failed the original manipulation check, only 
10.3% failed the second one. This suggest that the original manipulation check was perhaps too poorly worded to 
capture participants’ understanding of the Alford manipulation.  
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H1. Based on previous research, I hypothesized a main effect of guilt status such that 
guilty participants would be more likely to plead guilty compared to innocent participants.  
H2. Considering theories of self-presentation, I hypothesized a main effect of type of plea 
such that participants across conditions would be more likely to accept an Alford plea compared 
to a traditional guilty plea. 
H3. Furthermore, I hypothesized an interaction of guilt status and type of plea. In the 
Alford plea condition, the difference between guilty and innocent participants would be reduced 
such that innocent participants are more likely than guilty suspects to accept an Alford plea 
compared to a traditional plea.  
H4. I finally hypothesized that innocent participants who chose to accept an Alford plea 
would be more likely to cite the opportunity to maintain innocence and the opportunity to appear 
less guilty to others as the primary reason for their plea decision, compared to other conditions.  
Results 
Plea Decision. Overall, 51.2% participants accepted a plea, and 48.8% rejected. Table 2 
shows the percentages of participants who reported they would accept the plea across conditions.  
To investigate how guilt status (guilty vs innocent) and type of plea (traditional plea deal vs 
Alford plea deal) influences participants’ plea decisions, the dichotomous variable plea decision 
was submitted to a binary logistic regression with guilt status and type of plea as the predictors. 
In the guilt status group, guilty was the reference category; in the type of plea group, traditional 
was the reference category.  
The model was significant, Χ2(3) = 132, p < .001, and explained 38.2% of the variance in 
plea decisions (Nagelkerke’s R2). As one would expect, guilty participants were significantly 
more likely to accept a plea (78.4%) compared to innocent participants (22.9%), b = 2.043, 95% 
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CI [1.421, 2.665], OR = 7.715, p < .001. The type of plea did not significantly predict plea 
decisions, b = -.575, 95% CI [-1.268, .119], OR = .563, p = .104. 
However, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect, b = 1.037, 95% 
CI [ .061, 2.013], OR = 2.821, p = .037. While guilty participants were more likely to accept an 
Alford plea than a traditional plea (83.3% vs. 78.2%), the opposite was true for innocent 
participants (16.7% vs. 26.7%). Innocent participants offered an Alford plea were the least likely 
to accept a plea, compared to other participants (Figure 1).  
Reasoning behind Plea Decision. In an open-ended question, participants were asked to 
state their reasons for accepting or rejecting the offered deal. A research assistant blind to 
condition and I separately reviewed all responses and came up with 15 categories, including the 
two predetermined Alford related categories (Opportunity to maintain innocence and Opportunity 
to appear innocent to others) and one category for Other; responses that did not fit into any 
category, see Table 3 for all categories). We then coded for whether participants’ responses fit 
into the categories or not (several responses fit into more than one category). Examples of the 
most frequently mentioned reasons can be found in Table 4. 
Cohen’s κ for each category was calculated to assess the interrater reliability. The 
coefficients ranged from .4814 (“It was too extreme/It was just a study”) to .860 (“I was guilty”), 
with an average κ of .669 which represents a substantial degree of agreement between the raters.  
Among participants who accepted (n = 200), the most frequently stated reason was to 
avoid more severe consequences and/or uncertainty (72.5%). Among those who rejected a plea (n 
= 191), the most common cited reason for their plea decision was their innocence/that they were 
 
4 Cohen’s kappa for the category “Other” was not included in this average as it was predictably much lower (κ of 
.283) due to the category containing anything that would not fit into any of the other 14 categories.  
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not at fault (66%). Table 5 shows the percentages of the most common reasons broken down by 
plea decision, guilt status, and type of plea.  
One of the primary aims of this measure was to explore how often the ability to maintain 
innocence was mentioned, in particular by participants who accepted an Alford plea. Overall, I 
found that only 3% of participants mentioned this as a reason. As expected, this rationale was 
most frequently cited by innocent participants who accepted an Alford plea (35.5%) and was not 
cited by anyone who was offered a traditional plea (regardless of guilt status and plea decision). 
Only one participant cited the opportunity to appear innocent to others as a reason for accepting 
an Alford plea. 
Confidence in Plea Decision. Participants then rated how confident they were in their 
plea decision on a 10-point scale. Overall, participants were highly confident in their decisions, 
M = 7.29, SD = 2.23. I submitted confidence ratings to a two-way ANOVA with guilt status and 
type of plea as the independent variables and found no significant effects (see Table 6). 
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. Participants were asked, “Out of 100 outside observers 
who watch the police and prosecutor’s accusation and your decision to accept or reject the plea 
offer, how many would believe that you were guilty?” Across conditions, participants believed 
about half of observers would perceive them as guilty (M = 56.9, SD = 28.3; see Table 7 for 
means and standard deviations by condition). 
A two-way ANOVA indicated a main effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 172.40, p < .001, 
η2p = .308. Consistent with research on the illusion of transparency (Gilovitch & Savitsky, 1999), 
guilty participants were significantly more likely to believe that others would perceive them as 
guilty, (72.3% SD = 23.4), compared to innocent participants, (41% SD = 23.8). Although Alford 
participants tended to believe that they were more likely to be perceived as guilty compared to 
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those offered a traditional plea, this difference did not reach significance, F(1, 387) = 1.18, p = 
.277, η2p = .003. There was also no interaction, F(1, 329) = 1.28, p = .259, η
2
p = .003.  
To examine the effects of plea decision on anticipated guilt perceptions, I split the data 
between participants who accepted and those who rejected a plea, and then I conducted the same 
two-way ANOVA again (see Table 8).  
For participants who accepted the plea, guilty participants were more likely to believe that 
others would find them guilty (M = 76.41, SD = 20.82), compared to innocent participants, (M = 
53.86, SD = 23.35), F(1, 196) = 34.807, p < .001, η2p = .151. There was no effect of type of plea, 
F(1, 196) = 1.232, p = .268, η2p = .006, and no interaction, F(1, 196) = .001, p = .977, η
2
p < .001. 
The results for participants who rejected a plea were similar. Guilty participants were 
once again significantly more likely to anticipate that others would view them as guilty (M = 
57.21, SD = 26.13), compared to innocent participants (M = 37.23, SD = 22.58), F(1, 187) = 
23.199, p < .001, η2p = .110. Again, there was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 187) = .050, p = 
.824, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 187) = .016, p = .900, η
2
p < .001. 
Post-Plea State of Mind.  
Means and standard deviations for these measures across conditions can be found in 
Table 9. 
Difficulty in Decision Making. To explore how guilt status and type of plea influenced 
participants’ post-plea state of mind, all were asked to rate how difficult it was to make the plea 
decision on a 10-point scale. Overall, they reported that the decision was moderately difficult to 
make (M = 5.18, SD = 2.71). These ratings were submitted to a two-way ANOVA and no 
significant main effects were found, F(1, 387) = 3.02, p = .083, η2p = .008, and F(1, 387) = .734, 
p = .392, η2p = .002 for type of plea and guilt status, respectively. However, a significant 
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interaction effect was found, F(1, 387) = 3.902, p = .049, η2p = .010. Participants were more 
likely to report that the plea decision was difficult to make if they had been offered an Alford 
plea compared to if they had been offered a traditional plea—but only if they were innocent 
(Figure 2). 
Once again, I compared participants who accepted vs. rejected a plea offer to explore the 
possible association between the decision they made and self-reported decision difficulty. Among 
those who accepted a plea, a significant main effect of guilt status showed that innocent 
participants found the decision more difficult to make (M = 6.61, SD = 2.19) compared to those 
in the guilty condition (M = 4.95, SD = 2.48), F(1, 196) = 17.340, p < .001, η2p = .081. There was 
no effect of type of plea, F(1, 196) = .731, p = .394, η2p = .004, and no interaction, F(1, 196) = 
1.192, p = .276, η2p = .006. Among participants who rejected a plea, no significant effects were 
found (see Table 10). This result further indicates that innocent participants who accepted a plea 
primarily drove these results. 
Satisfaction with Plea Decision. Participants also rated how satisfied they were with 
their decision on a 10-point scale. Overall, they reported being moderately satisfied (M = 6.19, 
SD = 2.63). These ratings were submitted to a two-way ANOVA with guilt status and type of 
plea as the independent variables. Although the pattern of ratings suggested guilty Alford 
participants were the least satisfied with their plea decision, the differences were not significant 
(see Table 11).  
The data were then split between those who accepted versus rejected a plea offer. Among 
those who accepted the plea, guilty participants reported higher levels of satisfaction with their 
decision, (M = 5.88, SD = 2.40), compared to innocent participants, (M = 4.91, SD = 2.77), F(1, 
196) = 5.157, p = .024, η2p = .026. There was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 196) = .781, p = .378, 
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η2p = .004, and no interaction, F(1, 196) = 1.01, p = .316, η
2
p = .005. Among participants who 
rejected a plea, I found no significant effects (see Table 12).  
Pressure to Make Decision. Participants rated how much pressure they were under when 
making their plea decision (1-10). Across conditions, participants reported a high degree of 
pressure (M = 7.27, SD = 2.72). A two-way ANOVA showed that those in the Alford condition 
felt more pressure, (M = 7.64, SD = 2.46) compared to those presented with a traditional plea (M 
= 6.93, SD = 2.89). This effect was significant, F(1, 387) = 6.768, p = .010, η2p = .017. 
There was also a significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 4.249, p = .0840, η2p = 
.011, such that guilty participants reported being more pressured into making a decision (M = 
7.55, SD = 2.55) compared to innocent participants, (M = 6.97, SD = 2.86). There was no 
interaction between guilt status and type of plea, F(1, 387) = .330, p = .566, η2p = .001. 
Next, I separated participants who accepted vs. those who rejected a plea and conducted 
the same two-way ANOVAs. Among participants who accepted the plea, no significant effects 
were found (see Table 13). Among those who rejected a plea, however, Alford participants 
reported feeling more pressure (M = 7.36, SD = 2.62), compared to traditional plea participants 
(M = 6.50, SD = 2.99), F(1, 187) = 3.839, p = .051, η2p = .020. There was no effect of guilt status, 
F(1, 187) = .517, p = .473, η2p = .003, and no interaction, F(1, 187) = .146, p = .703, η
2
p = .001. 
Case Evaluation. 
Participants were asked to rate how serious they found the “crime” (i.e., cheating) they 
were accused of on a 10-point scale. Across conditions, participants rated the cheating as just 
above the midpoint, (M = 5.18, SD = 2.95). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 8.164, p = .005, η2p = .021, such that innocent participants rated 
the crime (cheating) as more severe (M = 5.60, SD = 2.97) compared to guilty participants (M = 
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4.76, SD = 2.89). There was no significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 387) = .475, p = .491, 
η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 387) = .258, p = .612, η
2
p = .001. 
Means and ANOVA statistics for subsequent case evaluation measures, strength of 
evidence and likelihood of conviction, can be found in Table 14. 
Consequences of Decision 
Consequences of Rejecting Plea. Participants rated to what degree (1-10) their decision 
was influenced by the consequences of rejecting the plea (i.e., being tried by the AIB). Overall, 
participants reported being moderately influenced by these consequences, (M = 6.66, SD = 2.91; 
see Table 15 for means and statistics). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
guilt status, F(1, 387) = 58.364, p < .001, η2p = .131, such that guilty participants reported that 
they were more influenced by the consequences of rejecting the plea (M = 7.70, SD = 2.48) than 
were innocent participants (M = 5.58, SD = 2.93). There was no significant main effect of type of 
plea, F(1, 387) = .685, p = .408, η2p = .002. However, a significant interaction was observed, F(1, 
387) = 5.667, p = .018, η2p = .014, such that guilty participants presented with a traditional plea 
reported feeling the most influenced by the consequences of rejecting the plea (Figure 3).  
Consequences of Accepting Plea. Next, participants rated to what degree their decision 
was influenced by the consequences of accepting the plea (i.e., 40 hours of community service). 
Across conditions, participants were moderately influenced by this, (M = 6.06, SD = 2.69). A 
two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 11.454, p < .001, 
η2p = .029, such that guilty participants were more influenced by the consequences of accepting 
the plea (M = 6.51, SD = 2.58) than innocent participants (M = 5.59, SD = 2.73). There was also a 
significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 387) = 4.473, p = .035, η2p = .011, as participants 
presented with an Alford plea reported being more influenced by the consequences of accepting, 
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(M = 6.36, SD = 2.59), than those presented with a traditional plea (M = 5.78, SD = 2.76). There 
was no interaction, F(1, 387) = .007, p = .934, η2p < .001. 
The Innocence Aspect of Alford. To examine how guilt status influence whether Alford 
participants were influenced by the ability to maintain innocence, I conducted an independent 
sample t-test and found a significant difference, t(185) = -4.19, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.56, -.921], d 
= - .613. As expected, innocent participants presented with an Alford plea reported being more 
influenced by the ability to maintain innocent than guilty participants, M = 7.02, SD = 2.80 vs. M 
= 5.28, SD = 2.88, respectively.  
To explore how plea decisions influenced this variable, participants who accepted vs. 
rejected the plea offer were separated for analysis. Among those who accepted a plea deal, 
innocents were significantly more influenced by the ability to maintain innocence (M = 8.00, SD 
= 2.21), compared to guilty participants (M = 5.16, SD = 2.83), t(28.424) = -4.562, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-4.111, -1.564], d = 1.12. Among participants who rejected the plea offer, however, this 
difference was not found, t(88) = -1.143, p = .256, 95% CI [-2.256, .681], d = .305. This result is 
not unsurprising since participants who rejected the plea would not benefit from being able to 
maintain innocence.  
Correlations. To explore the relationship among the dependent measures for possible 
mediations, correlations were calculated and presented in Table 16. Predictably, many of the 
dependent variables were significantly correlated. When participants rejected the offered plea, 
they were less likely to report that they would be perceived as guilty by others, that there was 
strong evidence against them, that they were likely to be convicted, and that they were influenced 
by consequences of either accepting or rejecting the plea. In contrast, when participants believed 
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others would perceive them as guilty, they were more likely to view the case against them as 
strong and reported being more concerned with consequences of accepting and rejecting the plea.   
Summary 
Contrary to predictions, innocent defendants who were offered an Alford plea were the 
least likely to accept the plea. These participants also reported having the hardest time making 
their decision. However, in line with my hypothesis, guilty participants were seven times more 
likely to accept a plea compared to innocent participants. As expected, innocent participants 
presented with an Alford plea reported being influenced by the ability to maintain innocence to a 
higher degree than guilty participants.  
Study 2 
Several studies using the cheating paradigm have found strong effects similar to those in 
the field (Dervan & Edkins, 2012; Perillo & Kassin, 2011). Still, the argument is sometimes made 
that this low-stakes cheating paradigm is limited in its generalizability (see Redlich et al., 2017 for 
a discussion). To extend these results, therefore, Study 2 aimed to test the same hypotheses using 
an actual crime vignette. Study 2 also serves as a replication of Study 1. The long-term goal is to 
compare the results of this project to future in-person laboratory studies.  
Method 
Participants 
For Study 2, the same a priori power analysis used in Study 1 indicated that a minimum 
of 351 participants would provide an adequate sample to detect a medium to small effect size. 
After oversampling to account for participant loss due to failed attention and/or manipulation 
check, 408 participants were recruited. Only two were removed for failing more than two checks, 
resulting in a final sample size of 406. Participants were all adult US citizens, recruited from 
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Prolific, and paid $1.78 for their time. Through Prolific’s screening tool, any participants who 
had participated in Study 1 were excluded from signing up.   
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 77, with a mean age of 31.2 (SD = 11.2). There were 
217 females, 177 males, 9 non-binary, and 3 participants who preferred not to report their gender. 
The racial/ethnic breakdown of the participants was as follows: White/European American 
(62.6%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander (14%), Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin 
American Country (9.9%), African American/Black (7.4%), Biracial/Multiracial (5.4%), Middle 
Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (n = 1, .2%), and Other (specified as African, and American, (n = 2, 
.5%). The sample represented 47 states. When asked about education, most participants reported 
having some level of higher education; 28.6% reported having “some college” experience, 8.4% 
had an associate degree, 28.8% had a college degree, 3% had some graduate school experience, 
13.1% had a master’s degree, and 3.4% had a doctoral degree.  
Only 13.6% of participants reported having ever been arrested; 46.6% reported that they 
had a family member who had been arrested (4.2% reported they did not know). Six participants 
(1.5%) worked in legal professions (paralegal or legal assistant), and 74 (18.2%) had family or 
friends working in legal professions (police officers, lawyers, and probation officers).  
Design 
The design was identical to that of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four cells produced by a 2 (Guilt Status: guilty vs. innocent) x 2 (Type of Plea: traditional vs. 
Alford) between-subjects design.  
Study Materials and Procedure  
Participants were recruited through Prolific and directed to a Qualtrics survey. The 
procedure was similar to that of Study 1 except for the following aspects: Instead of imagining 
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being part of a psychology study, induced or not to cheat, and then accused of cheating, 
participants were asked to imagine driving home from a friend’s house and hitting a pedestrian. 
They were then asked to imagine they were either guilty (they were speeding and thus criminally 
responsible for hitting the pedestrian) or innocent (they did not speed and thus it was just an 
accident) of the crime. Regardless of guilt status, they were told they had not been drinking any 
alcohol and they made a point to drive home while it was still light out. The crime vignette was 
loosely based on that used by Tor et al., (2010) and Gordon & Hellgren (2020). Participants were 
accused of involuntary manslaughter and offered either a traditional plea (six months in jail 
instead of a possible five years in prison if convicted at trial) or an Alford plea (the same deal 
with the added opportunity to proclaim innocence; see Appendix B for the full vignette)5. After 
reading the scenario, participants answered a series of questions aimed at examining their 
decision-making process.  
Dependent Measures 
Plea Decisions. As in Study 1, the primary dependent variable was the final decision to 
accept or reject the plea deal that was offered and then to explain the reasoning behind the 
decision. These latter responses were then coded with two aims: (1) to look specifically for 
mentions of the ability to maintain innocence and concerns about others’ perceptions of their 
guilt, and (2) explore other common themes more broadly.  
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. As in Study 1, participants were asked to estimate how 
many out of 100 observers watching them make their decision would believe they were guilty of 
the crime. 
 
5 The vignette in Study 2 is slightly different as it was run first of the five studies and then some changes were made. 
The main difference is that Study 2 included an initial offer that was then followed by either the traditional or the 
Alford plea. For subsequent studies, the initial offer was removed to avoid confusion among participants.  
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Post-Plea State of Mind. On 1–10-point scales, participants rated how confident they 
were that they made the right decision; how difficult the decision was to make; how satisfied they 
were with their decision; and how much pressure they felt when they were offered a deal.  
Case Evaluation. Participant evaluated a number of aspects of the case. Specifically, they 
rated how serious the wrongdoing (the involuntary manslaughter) they were accused of was (1 = 
Not at all to 10 = Very), how strong the evidence of them committing the crime was (1 = Not at 
all to 10 = Very), and how likely they were to be convicted if they were to go to trial (1 -100). 
Consequences of Decision. Next, participants rated on 10-point scales to what extent 
their plea decision was influenced by the consequences of rejecting the deal (i.e., going to trial 
and risking up to 5 years in prison) and the consequences of accepting the deal (i.e., six months in 
prison and avoiding trial). In the Alford plea condition, participants also rated whether they were 
influenced by the opportunity to maintain their innocence. 
Attention and Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked the same questions aimed 
at evaluating their attention level and understanding of the manipulation used in Study 2.6 
Participants who failed two or more of the following checks were removed: 
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decision-
making process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show 
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”  
Manipulation Checks. Participants were also asked whether they were speeding or not to 
ensure they were aware of their own guilt status. Finally, as a combined attention and 
 
6 The manipulation check aimed at ensuring participants understanding and appreciation of the ability to maintain 
innocence in Alford conditions was not used in this study as it was the first one that I ran. The manipulation check 
was subsequently added to the other studies.  
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manipulation check, participants were asked to provide the final sentence they were offered by 
the prosecutor (6 months prison time).  
Hypotheses 
 H1-H4 were identical to the hypotheses of Study 1. 
H5. Based on previous research showing strong effects even in a “low stakes” cheating 
paradigm, I predicted no differences in results from Study 1 to Study 2. 
Results 
 Plea Decision. Overall, 51.2% participants accepted a plea, and 48.8% rejected it. Table 
17 shows the acceptance percentages across conditions. A binomial logistic regression was 
conducted on the dichotomous plea decision. In the guilt status group, Guilty was the reference 
category, and in the type of plea group, Traditional was the reference category. The model was 
significant, Χ2(3) = 122, p < .001, and explained 34.5% of the variance in plea decisions 
(Nagelkerke’s R2).  
The main effect of guilt status was significant, b = 2.413, 95% CI [1.761, 3.064], OR = 
11.163, p < .001. Guilty participants were significantly more likely to accept a plea (77.8%) 
compared to innocent participants (24.6%). The main effect of type of plea was not significant, b 
= -.134, 95% CI [-.797, .530], OR = .875, p = .693. Likewise, there was no significant interaction 
effect, b = -.066, 95% CI [ -.988, .856], OR = .936, p = .888. 
Reasoning behind Plea Decision. As in Study 1, participants stated the reasons for 
making their plea decision. The same two coders from Study 1 reviewed all the open-ended 
responses and coded for whether or not they fit into one or several of the 15 categories 
determined in Study 1 (see Table 3). Cohen’s κ for each category was calculated to assess the 
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interrater reliability. The coefficients ranged from .3557 (“Consequences were not too bad”) to 
.852 (“To avoid harsher consequences”), with an average κ of .625 which represent a substantial 
degree of agreement between raters. Examples of the most frequently mentioned reasons are 
shown in Table 4. The coders’ codes were averaged to provide percentages. 
As in Study 1, the most frequent reason for participants who accepted a plea (n = 208) 
was to avoid harsher consequences and the uncertainty of trial (68%). Also as in Study 1, the 
most common reason cited by those who rejected a plea (n = 198) was their innocence/that they 
were not at fault (62.1%). Table 5 shows the percentages of the most frequently mentioned 
reasons broken down by plea decision, guilt status, and type of plea. Once again, I sought to 
explore how often the ability to maintain innocence was mentioned, in particular by participants 
who accepted an Alford plea. Overall, only 3.7% of participants reported that maintaining 
innocence was a reason for their decision. In line with Study 1, and as predicted, this reason was 
most frequently mentioned by innocent participants accepting an Alford plea (33.3%). Once 
again, no participants who accepted a traditional plea, regardless of their guilt status or plea 
decision, cited the opportunity to maintain innocence as a reason for their plea decision. The 
opportunity to appear innocent to others was cited as the reason for accepting an Alford plea by 
only one participant. 
Confidence in Plea Decision. Participants rated how confident they were in their 
decision (see Table 17 for means and ANOVA statistics across conditions). Overall, these ratings 
hovered above the midpoint, (M = 6.66, SD = 2.48). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of type of plea, F(1, 402) = 4.389, p = .037, η2p = .011, such that participants 
presented with a traditional plea offer were more confident (M= 6.91. SD = 2.43) compared to 
 
7 As in Study 1, the category “Other” was not included in the calculation of the average Cohen’s kappa as the rating 
was much lower than the rest (.258), which was to be expected due to the nature of the category.  
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those offered an Alford plea (M = 6.40, SD = 2.50). The main effect of guilt status was not 
significant, F(1, 402) = .888, p = .346, η2p = .002, nor was the interaction, F(1, 402) = .426, p = 
.792, η2p < .001.  
 Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. Participants were asked “Out of 100 outside observers 
who watch the police and prosecutor’s accusation and your decision to accept or reject the plea 
offer, how many would believe that you were guilty?” (See Table 18 for results on this measure). 
Compared to Study 1, participants’ overall ratings were slightly higher: they reported that 59.5% 
of observers would perceive them as guilty (SD = 26.5). A two-way ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of guilt status, F(1, 402) = 125.341, p < .001, η2p = .238. Guilty participants were 
significantly more likely to believe others would perceive them as guilty, (72.4% SD = 21.9), 
compared to innocent participants, (46.6% SD = 24.4). There was no significant effect of plea 




 As in Study 1, I separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected the plea 
offer to explore the influence of that decision on anticipated guilt perceptions (see Table 19 for 
means and statistics). Among participants who accepted a plea, those who were guilty believed 
others were more likely to view them as guilty (M = 79.24, SD = 16.39) compared to innocent 
participants, (M = 67.40, SD = 20.98), F(1, 204) = 17.531, p < .001, η2p = .151. There was no 
effect of type of plea, F(1, 204) = 2.078, p = .151, η2p = .010, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = 
1.349, p = .247, η2p = .007. Among those who rejected a plea, guilty participants were more 
likely to anticipate that others would view them as guilty (M = 48.22, SD = 22.98), compared to 
innocent participants, (M = 39.74, SD = 21.46), F(1, 194) = 5.667, p = .018, η2p = .028. There 
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was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 198) = .080, p = .777, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 198) 
= 1.842, p = .176, η2p = .009.  
Post-Plea State of Mind 
Overall means and standard deviations for these measures can be found in Table 20. 
Difficulty in Decision Making. Participants gave an overall difficulty rating of 6.82 (SD 
= 2.96). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 402) = 3.963, 
p = .047, η2p = .010, such that innocent participants found the decision significantly more difficult 
to make, (M = 7.11, SD = 2.88) compared to guilty participants (M = 6.53, SD = 3.03). There 
were no significant effect of type or plea, F(1, 402) = .130, p = .719, η2p < .001 for type of plea 
and no interaction, F(1, 402) = .956, p = .741, η2p < .001.  
Among participants who accepted a plea, a significant main effect of guilt status showed 
that innocent participants found the decision more difficult to make (M = 7.78, SD = 2.58) 
compared to guilty participants (M = 6.30, SD = 3.05), F(1, 204) = 10.215, p = .002, η2p = .048. 
There was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 204) = 1.126, p = .290, η2p = .005, and no interaction, 
F(1, 204) = 2.702, p = .102, η2p = .013. Among participants who rejected a plea, the pattern was 
different as no significant effects were found (see Table 21). 
Satisfaction with Plea Decision. Participants also rated their level of satisfaction with 
their decision. Across conditions, they were moderately satisfied (M = 5.75, SD = 2.69). A two-
way ANOVA revealed no significant differences across conditions (see Table 22). Then I 
separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected a plea (see Table 23 for means and 
statistics). 
Among those who accepted the plea, guilty participants were more likely to report 
satisfaction with the decision, (M = 6.03, SD = 2.59), compared to innocent participants, (M = 
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3.44, SD = 2.18), F(1, 204) = 40.179, p < .001, η2p = .165. There was no effect of type of plea, 
F(1, 204) = .511, p = .476, η2p = .002, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = .118, p = .734, η
2
p = .001. 
Among participants who rejected a plea, guilt status was significant, F(1, 204) = 40.179, p < 
.001, η2p = .165. However, in contrast to the pattern for participants who accepted a plea, 
innocent participants were significantly more likely to be satisfied with their decision (M = 6.31, 
SD = 2.63), compared to guilty participants (M = 5.40, SD = 2.73). There was no effect of type of 
plea, F(1, 204) = .511, p = .476, η2p = .002, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = .000, p = .732, η
2
p = 
.001. These patterns suggest that guilty participants felt more satisfied when they accepted a plea, 
and innocents were more satisfied when they rejected a plea.  
Pressure to Make Decision. Overall, participants reported feeling highly pressured to 
make a plea decision (M = 7.74, SD = 2.55). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of type of plea, F(1, 329) = 4.184, p = .042, η2p = .013, such that participants presented 
with an Alford plea reported being under more pressure, (M = 7.53, SD = 2.55) compared to 
those presented with a traditional plea (M = 6.93, SD = 2.83). There was no significant main 
effect of guilt status, F(1, 329) = 3.094, p = .080, η2p = .009, and no interaction, F(1, 329) = .093, 
p = .761, η2p < .001. 
Once again, I separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected the plea offer 
(see Table 24 for means and statistics). For those who accepted the plea, innocent participants 
reported more pressure to make a decision, (M = 8.80, SD = 1.70), compared to those who were 
guilty, (M = 7.49, SD = 2.77), F(1, 204) = 9.825, p =.002, η2p = .046. There was no effect of type 
of plea, F(1, 204) = .127, p = .722, η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = 1.031, p = .311, η
2
p 
= .005. Looking at participants who rejected a plea, no significant effects were found. 
Case Evaluation 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  52 
 
Crime Severity. In contrast to Study 1, participants rated the severity of the crime as very 
high, (M = 8.59, SD = 1.84). A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects, potentially due 
to this seeming ceiling effect. Means and ANOVA statistics for the remaining case evaluations 
measures, strength of evidence and likelihood of conviction, can be found in Table 25.   
Consequences of Plea Decision 
Consequences of Rejecting Plea. Participants reported being highly influenced by the 
consequences of rejecting the plea, (M = 7.61, SD = 2.56; see Table 26 for means and ANOVA 
statistics across conditions). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt 
status, F (1, 402) = 9.06, p = .006, η2p = .022. Guilty participants were more influenced by the 
consequences of rejecting the plea (M = 7.99, SD = 2.39) than innocent participants were (M = 
7.23, SD = 2.67). There was no significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 402) = .029, p = .865, 
η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 402) = .048, p = .827, η
2
p < .001. 
Consequences of Accepting Plea. Participants also reported being highly influenced by 
the consequences of accepting a plea, (M = 7.40, SD = 2.48). A two-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 402) = 17.561, p < .001, η2p = .042, such that guilty 
participants said they were more influenced by the consequences of accepting the plea (M = 7.91, 
SD = 2.22) than innocent participants (M = 6.89, SD = 2.59). There was no significant main effect 
of type of plea, F(1, 402) = .093, p = .890, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 402) = .125, p = 
.724, η2p < .001. 
The Innocence Aspect of Alford. Participants in the Alford condition rated the extent to 
which their decision was influenced by the opportunity to maintain innocence (1-10). Overall, 
their ratings were just above the midpoint, 5.93, (SD = 3.10). I conducted an independent samples 
t-test to explore if guilt status would influence this rating and found no significant difference, 
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t(200) = -.798, p = .426, 95% CI [-1.21, .512], d = - .112. Innocent participants said they were 
slightly more influenced by the ability to maintain innocence (M = 6.10, SD = 3.05) compared to 
guilty participants (M = 5.75, SD = 3.14), but this difference did not reach significance.  
To examine whether participants’ plea decisions influenced their view of the opportunity 
to maintain innocence, I separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected a plea. 
Among participants who accepted a plea, innocent participants reported being influenced more by 
the ability to maintain innocence (M = 7.44, SD = 2.56), compared to guilty participants (M = 
5.95, SD = 3.19), t(55.646) = -2.451, p = .017, 95% CI [-2.717, -.273], d = .515. Among 
participants who rejected a plea, no significant effect was found, t(94) = -.851, p = .417, 95% CI 
[-2.108, .881], d = .203. 
 Correlations. As in Study 1, correlations among all dependent variables are presented 
(see Table 27), and similar patterns were found. Participants who rejected a plea also reported 
perceiving the case against them as weak and were less likely to be influenced by consequences 
of accepting or rejecting the offered plea. Predictably, many of the case evaluation variables were 
associated with each other. 
Summary 
Overall, guilty participants were 11 times more likely to accept a plea compared to 
innocent participants, with a plea acceptance rate identical to that of Study 1 (51.2%). Contrary to 
predictions, the results differed between the cheating vignette of Study 1 compared to the crime 
vignette in Study 2. Specifically, the crime was rated as far more severe, so a ceiling effect may 
have contributed to the overall fewer effects of plea type in Study 2. An alternative explanation 
for the differences could be that participants in Study 1 were students who were asked to imagine 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  54 
 
taking part in a study at their university. This scenario may have been easier for participants to 
immerse themselves in, compared to being accused of voluntary manslaughter.  
Study 3 
A second goal of the present research was to assess observers’ perceptions of Alford 
defendants. Advocates for the Alford plea have suggested it offers a beneficial alternative for 
innocent defendants who do not want to risk a trial (Ronis, 2009; Ward, 2003). Others have 
argued that defendants who want to preserve their positive self-perception and avoid public 
judgement may benefit specifically from asserting their innocence through an Alford plea 
(Schneider, 2013). However, the notion that observers may view Alford pleaders in more positive 
terms has not been empirically tested. Studies 3 through 5 aimed to explore lay perceptions of 
Alford pleaders by exposing them to defendants accused of different types of wrongdoing and 
offered either a traditional plea or an Alford plea that the defendant either accepted or rejected. I 
then asked them to provide their overall perception of the defendant and his plea decision.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Because the design and planned analyses were similar to those of Study 1 and 2, the same 
a priori power analyses and minimum sample size of 351 participants was used. 
Paralleling Study 1, participants had to be students in order to participate. Initially, data 
collection was done through the City University’s SONA system but because recruitment was 
slow and the data quality low, I completed data collection by recruiting college students through 
Prolific. After oversampling to account for participation loss, a total of 437 participants were 
recruited, 352 from Prolific and 85 from SONA. Participants who failed two or more 
manipulation checks were removed, yielding a final sample of 411 participants, 342 from 
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Prolific, and 69 from SONA. Individuals who had taken part in a previous Alford study were 
excluded.  
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74, with the mean age of 30.4, (SD = 10.8), 240 
were female, 160 male, 6 non-binary, and 4 preferred not to report their gender. The racial/ethnic 
breakdown of the participants was as follows: White/European American (60.8%), 
Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country (14.4%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific 
Islander (9.5%), African American/Black (9.2%), Biracial/Multiracial (3.6%), Middle 
Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (n = 5, 1.2%), and Native American/American Indian/Indigenous 
(n = 5, 1.2%). The sample consisted of 18% of Freshmen, 10.9% of Sophomores, 10.9% Juniors, 
and 60.1% Seniors, and represented 42 states. 13% reported having been arrested, and 31.8% 
reported having a family member who had been arrested (5.6% said they did not know). No 
participants reported working in a legal profession, but 14.4% had family members who did 
(lawyers, police officers, and court reporters).  
Prolific participants were compensated with $1.78 for their time, and the SONA sample 
received class credit for their participation. They were randomly assigned into one of four cells 
produced by a 2 (Type of Plea: traditional vs Alford) x 2 (Decision: reject vs accept) between-
subjects design.  
Study Materials and Procedure  
An online Qualtrics survey opened with an informed consent page. Afterward, 
participants read a vignette describing a male student, Michael Anderson, who took part in the 
same procedure described in Study 1 (see Appendix C for full vignette). After reading the 
vignette, participants were presented with a questionnaire to assess their perceptions of the 
student and his decision. They were then debriefed and compensated.  
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Dependent Measures 
Guilt Perception and Confidence. The main dependent measure was whether 
participants believed the student they read about, Michael, was guilty or innocent of cheating. 
This variable was measured in two ways: a dichotomous guilty vs. innocent verdict and a 
continuous rating of confidence in that perception, rated from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very).  
Plea Decision Perceptions. To evaluate how participants perceived the plea and decision, 
I asked participants to rate (1) to what degree Michael made the right decision (1 = Not at all to 
10 = A lot), (2) how likely it is they would make the same decision in that situation (1 = Not at all 
to 10 = Very), (3) what decision they would make (accept or reject), and (4) how fair they 
thought the plea offer was (1 = Not at all fair to 10 = Very fair). 
Perceptions of the Defendant. To examine observers’ perceptions of the defendant, I 
used measures from previous research on stigma of false confessors (Clow & Leach, 2005; 
Scherr et al., 2018). First, participants rated their agreement with statements positing that Michael 
Anderson was intelligent, competent, and confident (these ratings were made on a 5-point scale). 
Following Scherr et al., a composite perception score was then calculated by summing the ratings 
from these questions. Scherr et al. (2018) found this composite score has high reliability (α = 
.875). These ratings all related to the defendants’ competence, in accordance the competence 
dimension identified in stereotype research (Fiske et al., 2002).  
Participants also rated their agreement with statements stating that Michael Anderson was 
friendly and honest. These ratings were in part taken from Clow and Leach (2015) and inspired 
by the “warmth” dimension form Fiske’s research (2002). Finally, participants rated whether they 
agreed with the suggestion that Michael Anderson was remorseful (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = 
Strongly Disagree) and blameworthy for his situation (1 = not at all to 10 = fully to blame). 
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These final ratings were taken from previous research (Hellgren & Kassin, 2018). Together, these 
measures aimed to test the hypothesis that Alford defendants maintain a positive reputation by 
maintaining innocence. 
Attention and Manipulation Checks. To ensure participants paid attention and 
understood the stimulus material, a series of attention and manipulation check questions were 
asked. The questions were as follows:  
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decision-
making process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show 
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”  
Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked to respond True or False to the following 
question: “The plea Michael was offered required him to admit guilt and accept responsibility for 
the cheating.”8 As a combined attention and manipulation check, participants were asked to 
provide the final sentence Michael was offered as part of the plea (40 hours of community 
service). Participants who failed two or more checks were ultimately removed.  
Hypotheses  
H1. In line with previous research by Hellgren and Kassin (2018), I hypothesized a main 
effect of plea decision, such that when Michael rejected an offer he would be seen as less guilty 
than when he accepted an offer, regardless of type of plea. 
H2. I further predicted that Michael would be perceived as less guilty if he accepted an 
Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional guilty plea, based on him maintaining his 
innocence. 
 
8 See 1 for an explanation as to why this manipulation check was not used to exclude participants.   
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H3. Finally, I hypothesized that Michael would receive more positive perception ratings 
when he accepted an Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional plea.  
Results 
Guilt Perceptions  
Overall, 28% participants believed that the student was guilty, and 72% believed he was 
innocent (see Table 28 for overall percentages). A binomial logistic regression was conducted on 
the dichotomous guilt perception variable with type of plea and plea decision as the predictors. In 
the guilt status group, guilty was the reference category, and in the type of plea group, traditional 
was the reference category. The model was significant, Χ2(3) = 46, p < .001, and explained 15.2 
% of the variance in participants’ guilt perceptions (Nagelkerke’s R2).  
The main effect of plea decision was significant, b = 1.709, 95% CI [1.003, 2.414], OR = 
5.522, p < .001. The student who accepted a plea was more likely to be seen as guilty (42.9%) 
compared to the student who rejected a plea (13.5%). Type of plea was not a significant 
predictor, b = .0345, 95% CI [-.522, .591], OR = 1.035, p = .903, and there was no interaction, b 
= -.2.667, 95% CI [ -1.240, .706], OR = .766, p = .591. 
 Participants also rated how confident they were in their guilt perceptions. Overall levels 
of confidence were high (M = 6.95, SD = 1.97). A two-way ANOVA with plea decision and type 
of plea as the independent variables and found no significant effects (see Table 29). 
Plea Decision Perceptions 
Right Plea Decision  
Participants rated their belief that the student had made the right plea decision (overall M 
= 6.29, SD = 2.64; means and ANOVA statistics can be found in Table 30). A two-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of plea decision, F(1, 407) = 56.549, p < .001, η2p = .122. 
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Participants who read that the student rejected the plea offer were more likely to believe he made 
the right decision, (M = 7.20, SD = 2.15), compared to those who read that he accepted the offer, 
(M = 5.36, SD = 2.77). There was no significant effect of plea type, F(1, 407) = .034, p = .854, 
η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 407) = 1.80, p = .180, η
2
p = .004.  
Personal Plea Decision 
Participants were asked to indicate the plea decision they would have made in the same 
situation. Overall, 69.8% of participants predicted that they would reject the deal; only 30.2% 
thought they would accept it. Percentages across conditions can be found in Table 31. 
A binomial logistic regression with Traditional and Accept as the reference categories 
revealed a significant model, Χ2(3) = 12.9, p = .005, which explained 4.4% of the variance in 
participants’ responses (Nagelkerke’s R2). Plea decision was a significant predictor of 
participant’s plea decision, b = 0.633, 95% CI [.009, 1.257], OR = 1.883, p = .047. Overall, 
participants were more likely to reject than accept the plea and this was particularly true when 
they read about a student who also rejected it. Type of plea was not a significant predictor, b = -
.319, 95% CI [-.890, .251], OR = .727, p = .273, and there was no interaction, b = .190, 95% CI 
[-.675, 1.055, OR = 1.209, p = .667. 
 Participants were also asked how likely it was that they were to make the same decision 
as the student in his situation. Overall, they tended to report they would have made the same 
decision (M = 6.42, SD = 2.88). A two-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the plea 
rejection condition were more likely to report they would make the same decision, (M = 7.57, SD 
= 2.34), compared to those in the plea acceptance condition, (M = 5.24, SD = 2.92), F(1, 407) = 
80.48, p < .001, η2p = .165. There was no significant effect of plea type, F(1, 407) = .024, p = 
.876, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 407) = 2.51, p = .114, η
2
p = .006.  
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 See Table 30 for means and ANOVA statistics for fairness of plea measure. 
Perceptions of the Defendant  
On 1–5-point scales, participants rated the student defendant on several characteristics of 
relevance to stigma (the higher the score, the more positive the impression; see Table 31 for 
overall means and ANOVA statistics).  
Composite Score. The three measures pertaining to the competence dimension (Fiske et 
al., 2002) taken from Scherr et al. (2018) (competence, intelligence, confidence) were summed to 
create a total sigma measure (ranging from 1 to 15, with a high score indicating a more positive 
impression). Overall, participants gave Michael positive ratings, (M = 11.1, SD = 2.52). 
There was a significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 407) = 4.404, p = .036, η2p = 
.011, such that participants rated the student more negatively when he accepted an Alford plea (M 
= 10.84, SD = 2.53), than when he accepted a traditional plea (M =11.39, SD = 2.49). A main 
effect of plea decision was also obtained, F(1, 407) = 62.196, p < .001, η2p = .133, indicating that 
Michael was seen in a more positive light when he rejected a deal (M = 12.02, SD = 2.197) than 
when he accepted it (10.18, SD = 2.496). There was no interaction, F(1, 407) = .022, p = .882, η2p 
< .001. 
For the remaining individual trait ratings, see Table 32 for means and ANOVA statistics.  
Remorsefulness and Blameworthiness. Overall, the student was seen as only slightly 
remorseful, with a rating of 2.99 out of 5 (SD = .940). Participants perceived the student as more 
remorseful when he was offered a traditional plea (M = 3.06, SD = .983) than an Alford plea (M = 
2.92, SD = .891). However, this effect was just barely significant, F(1, 407) = 3.582, p = .059, η2p 
= .009. Next, a significant main effect of plea decision was obtained, F(1, 407) = 40.263, p < 
.001, η2p = .090, such that participants thought the student was more remorseful when he 
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accepted a plea (M = 3.27, SD = .821) than when he rejected it (M = 2.72, SD = .969). The 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 407) = .895, p = .345, η2p = .002. 
Next, on a 1–10-point scale, participants rated the student as low on blameworthiness, (M 
= 4.24, SD = 2.61). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of plea decision, F(1, 
407) = 10.774, p = .001, η2p = .026, such that participants saw the student as more blameworthy 
when he accepted a deal, (M = 4.66, SD =2.78) than when he rejected it (M = 3.83, SD = 2.38). 
There was no significant effect for type of plea, F(1, 407) = .441, p = .507, η2p = .001, and no 
interaction, F(1, 407) = .041, p = .839, η2p < .001 (See Table 33). 
Correlations. Table 34 shows that participants who perceived the student as not guilty 
were also more likely to rate him favorably. In contrast, they were less likely to see the student as 
remorseful when they believed he was innocent. Perceived lack of remorse was further associated 
with participants being less likely to report they would make the same decision as the student. 
Next, many of the stigma/perception scores were predictably correlated with each other, and also 
predicted more positive views of the student’s decision. 
Summary  
As predicted, participants saw the cheating-accused student as less culpable when he 
rejected an offer than when he accepted one. However, there were no differences between the 
types of pleas. Overall, participants believed that the student had made the right decision when he 
rejected a plea. In this case they were also more likely to report they would have made the same 
decision, and that their personal plea decision would be to reject the plea. When the student 
accepted a plea, he was seen as less competent, intelligent, confident, and honest. In contrast to 
expectations, when he was offered an Alford plea, he was more subject to negative judgements 
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Participants and Design 
As in the previous studies, an a priori power analyses suggested a minimum sample size 
of 351 participants to detect a small to medium effect size. After oversampling to account for 
participation loss, 436 adult American citizens were recruited through Prolific. Those who failed 
two or more attention and/or manipulation checks were removed (n = 45), yielding a final sample 
of 391 participants. As before, participants from any previous study were precluded from 
participation.  
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 68, with the mean age of 31.4, (SD = 10.2), 189 
were female, 193 male, 7 non-binary, and 2 preferred not to report their gender. The racial/ethnic 
breakdown of the participants was as follows: White/European American (71.4%), Asian/Asian 
American/Pacific Islander (11.8%), Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country 
(7.4%), African American/Black (4.9%), Biracial/Multiracial (4.1%), and Native 
American/American Indian/Indigenous (n = 2, .5%). Most participants reported having some 
higher education; 22.6% reported having “some college”, 8% had an associate degree, 33.7% had 
a college degree, 2.6% had some graduate school education, 11.6% had a master’s degree, and 
3.6% had a doctoral degree.  
Asked if they had ever been arrested, 13.4% reported that they had, and 39.8% reported 
having a family member who had (6.2% said they did not know). Only 1.5% of participants (n = 
6) reported working a legal profession (paralegal, lawyer, investigator, forensic scientist, and 
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probation officer), and 16.5% had family members who did (lawyers, police officers, and 
correction officers). Participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions produced by 
a 2 (Type of Plea: traditional plea deal vs Alford plea deal) x 2 (Decision: reject vs accept) 
between-subjects design.  
Study Materials and Procedure  
The procedure in Study 4 were identical to that of Study 3, apart from the following: 
Instead of reading a vignette of a male student accused of cheating in an experiment, participants 
read a vignette describing a male motorist accused of involuntary manslaughter, as described in 
Study 2. They read that this individual was driving home after a dinner at a friend’s house when 
he hit an elderly man with his car. The pedestrian later dies, and the motorist is charged with 
involuntary manslaughter. Participants then read about how the prosecutor offered the defendant 
either a traditional plea deal or an Alford plea, which he either then accepted or rejected (see 
Appendix E for full vignette). 
As in Study 3, participants then completed a questionnaire in which they indicated 
whether they believed the defendant to be guilty or innocent and rated their confidence in that 
belief. Then they rated the defendant on the following dependent measures: 
Additional Dependent Measures  
Perceptions of the Plea Decision. Participants rated on 1–10-point scales (1) to what 
degree the defendant made the right plea decision, (2) how likely it is they would have made the 
same decision, (3) what decision they would personally make (accept or reject), and (4) how fair 
they thought the plea offer was. 
Perceptions of the Defendant. The same perception measures used in Study 3 were used. 
Participants rate how intelligent, competent, and confident the defendant was on a 5-point scale. 
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As before, a composite perception score was calculated by summing these three questions (α = 
.875; Scherr et al., 2018). Participants also rated the defendant for how friendly, honest, and 
remorseful he was. Finally, they rated how blameworthy the defendant was for his situation.  
Attention and Manipulation Checks. To ensure participants were paying attention and 
understood the stimulus material, the same attention and manipulation check questions used in 
the previous studies were used here. The questions were as follows:  
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decision-
making process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show 
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”  
Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked to respond True or False to the following 
question: “The plea Michael was offered required him to admit guilt and accept responsibility for 
the crime.”9 As a combined attention and manipulation check, participants were asked to provide 
the final sentence Michael was offered as part of the plea (6 months prison time). Participants 
who failed two or more checks were ultimately removed from analyses. 
Hypotheses 
H1-H3 are identical to those of Study 3.  
H4. As in Studies 1 and 2, I did not predict differences between Study 3 and Study 4.  
Results 
Guilt Perceptions 
Overall, 47.3% participants believed the defendant was guilty, and 52.7% believed he was 
innocent (see Table 35 for percentages across conditions). A binomial logistic regression was 
conducted on the dichotomous guilt perception variable with type of plea and decision as the 
 
9 See 1 for an explanation as to why this manipulation check was not used to exclude participants.   
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predictors. In the guilt status group, guilty was the reference category, and in the type of plea 
group, traditional was the reference category. The model was significant, Χ2(3) = 11.3, p = .010, 
and explained 3.8% of the variance in participants’ guilt perceptions (Nagelkerke’s R2).  
The main effect of plea decision was significant, b = 0.788, 95% CI [.205, 1.370], OR = 
2.108, p = .008. Participants who read that the defendant accepted the plea were more likely to 
believe he was guilty (55.7%) than when he rejected a plea (39.2%). The type of plea did not 
significantly predict guilt perceptions, b = .204, 95% CI [-.368, .777], OR = 1.227, p = .484, nor 
was there an interaction, b = -.221, 95% CI [ -1.028, .586], OR = .820, p = .592. 
 Overall, participants were confident in their perceptions of guilt and innocence, M = 6.02, 
SD = 2.54. A two-way ANOVA with plea decision and type of plea and decision as the 
independent variables and no significant effects were found (see Table 29). 
Perceptions of the Plea Decision 
For overall means and ANOVA statistics, see Table 36. 
Right Plea Decision 
Participants rated to what degree the defendant had made the right decision. Overall, they 
mostly agreed the defendant had made the right decision, (M = 6.02, SD = 2.54). A main effect of 
plea decision was found, F(1, 387) = 7.252, p = .007, η2p = .018. Participants who read that the 
defendant accepted a deal were more likely to agree that his decision was the right one (M = 6.38, 
SD = 2.43) than those who read that he rejected the offer, (M = 5.68, SD = 2.60). There was no 
significant effect of plea type, F(1, 387) = .243, p = .622, η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 387) 
= 1.29, p = .257, η2p = .003.  
Personal Plea Decision 
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Asked to indicate the decision they would have made, 55.2% of participants said they 
would have accepted the plea offer. Means across conditions can be found in Table 37. 
A binomial logistic regression with Traditional and Accept as the reference categories 
revealed a significant model, Χ2(3) = 18.9, p < .001, which explained 6.3% of the variance in 
participants’ responses (Nagelkerke’s R2). Plea decision was a significant predictor of 
participants’ personal plea decision, b = 0.999, 95% CI [.407, 1.591], OR = 2.716, p < .001. 
Participants said they were more likely to have accepted the plea when they read about a 
defendant who did the same. Type of plea did not predict guilt perceptions, b = 0.0122, 95% CI [-
.587, 0.612], OR = 1.012, p = .968, and there was no interaction, b = -0.234, 95% CI [-1.054, 
0.586], OR = .798, p = .576 
On the question of whether they would have made the same decision as the defendant, (M 
= 6.29, SD = 2.71), a borderline significant main effect of plea decision was found, F(1, 387) = 
26.940, p = .056, η2p = .009. Participants who read about a defendant who accepted a deal were 
more likely to report they would have made the same decision, (M = 6.56, SD = 2.61), compared 
to when the defendant rejected the plea offer, (M = 6.03, SD = 2.79). Once again, there was no 
significant effect of plea type, F(1, 387) = .507, p = .477, η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 387) 
= .127, p = .895, η2p < .001.  
See Table 36 for means and ANOVA statistics for the fairness of plea measure. 
Defendant Perceptions 
As in Study 3, participants rated on 1–5-point scales their perceptions of the defendant on 
a number of characteristics (higher scores indicate more positive impressions).  
Composite Score. As in Study 3, ratings of competence, intelligence, and confidence 
were summed (scores ranged from 1 to 15). Overall, participants had a positive view of the 
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defendant, (M = 11.42, SD = 2.33). A significant main effect of plea decision was found, F(1, 
387) = 10.307, p = .001, η2p= .026, such that defendants who rejected a plea were less subject to 
stigma (M = 11.04, SD = 2.39) compared to defendants who accepted a plea (M = 11.79, SD = 
2.22). There was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 387) = .008, p = .929, η2p < .001, and no 
interaction between variables, F(1, 387) = .060, p = .806, η2p < .001. 
For the remaining individual traits, see Table 38 for means and ANOVA statistics. 
Remorsefulness and Blameworthiness. Participants saw the defendant as more 
remorseful when he accepted a plea (M = 3.97, SD = .897), compared to when he rejected a plea 
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.09), F(1, 387) = 36.598, p < .001, η2p = .086. A significant main effect of type 
of plea was also obtained, F(1, 387) = 6.345, p = .012, η2p = .016, such that participants saw the 
defendant as more remorseful when he was offered a traditional plea (M = 3.78, SD = 1.05) than 
an Alford plea (M = 3.55, SD = 1.03). There was no interaction of type of plea and plea decision, 
F(1, 387) = .312, p = .577, η2p = .001. 
Participants then rated to what degree they believed the defendant was to blame for his 
situation. Across conditions, participants rated the defendant as moderately blameworthy, (M = 
5.73, SD = 2.34). A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects (see Table 39). 
Correlations. As before, Table 40 shows strong correlations between perceptions of 
innocence and positive ratings of the defendant. Participants perceived the defendant in a more 
positive way when they also believed he was innocent. In contrast to Study 3, remorsefulness was 
positively correlated with other perceptions scores. Those who believed the defendant was 
innocent were also more likely to perceived him as remorseful, which was the opposite of the 
finding of Study 3. There were also several negative correlations between defendant 
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blameworthiness and perception scores, such that when participants viewed the defendant 
favorably, they were also likely to report he was not to blame for the situation.  
Summary  
Once again, participants were more likely to perceive the defendant as guilty when he 
accepted a plea than when he rejected it. In contrast to Study 3, however, the defendant was seen 
as having made the right decision when he accepted a plea. In this case, participants were also 
more likely to report they would have made the same decision. Although Studies 3 and 4 differed 
in several ways, it is possible that the severity of the offense the defendant was accused of 
influenced perceptions of his plea decision. Study 4 once again found that the defendant was 
perceived as less honest and remorseful when he was offered an Alford plea than a traditional 
plea. This will be further addressed in the General Discussion.  
Study 5 
 The absence of significant differences between defendants who accept traditional pleas 
versus Alford pleas studies 3 and 4 may have resulted from the fact that the defendants did not 
request the Alford plea, they merely accepted or rejected it. What would happen if a defendant 
insisted on his innocence and then was offered an Alford plea to accommodate his insistence? A 
fifth study was added to examine potential differences in perceptions of defendants who receive 
an Alford plea offer initiated by the prosecutor compared to those who requested it themselves.  
Method  
Participants and Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions based on what plea they 
were offered: (1) traditional plea, (2) Alford plea initiated by the prosecutor, and (3) Alford plea 
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initiated by defendant. I conduced an a priori power analysis for one-way ANOVA and found 
that 381 was an adequate sample size to be able to detect a small effect size with 80% power. 
After oversampling to account for participants lost, 403 adults were recruited from 
Prolific. After removing two for failing two or more attention and/or manipulation checks, the 
final sample consisted of 401 participants, who were compensated with $1.68. Participants who 
had experience of any of the previously presented studies were excluded.  
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73, with the mean age of 32.9, (SD = 11.9); 215 
were female, 180 male, and four non-binary. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the participants was 
as follows: White/European American (67.5%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander (10.8%), 
Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country (9%), African American/Black (8%), 
Biracial/Multiracial (4%), Native American/American Indian/Indigenous (0.5%), and Middle 
Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (0.3%). As in previous studies, most participants reported having 
some level of higher education with 20.7% reported “some college” education, 8.2% had an 
Associate degree, 35.4% had a college degree, 4.7% had some graduate school education, 12% 
had a master’s degree, and 3.7% had a doctoral degree. When asked if they had ever been 
arrested, 13% of participations reported they had been, and 39.3% reported having a family 
member who had been arrested (5% said they did not know). Nine participants reported working 
in a legal profession (attorneys, crime victim advocate, office manager at law office), and 18.8% 
had family members who did (lawyers, police officers, probation officers, and judges).  
Study Materials and Procedure  
Study 5 was similar in procedure to Study 4 with some minor differences. Participants 
read the same vignette about Michael Anderson hitting an elderly pedestrian with his car and then 
being charged with involuntary manslaughter. The difference came in the pleas that were offered. 
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In addition to the traditional plea and the Alford plea, a third condition was presented in which 
the defendant rejected a traditional deal, proclaiming his innocence, only to then be offered an 
Alford plea (see Appendix F for full vignette). Unlike Study 4, the defendant’s plea decision was 
not a manipulated variable; he accepted the plea in every condition. As in prior studies, 
participants were presented with a questionnaire and asked whether they believed that the 
defendant was innocent or guilty and rated their confidence in that belief. Additional dependent 
measures were identical to those previously obtained.  
Attention and Manipulation Checks. To ensure participants were paying attention and 
understood the stimulus material, the same series of attention and manipulation check questions 
used previously were asked. The questions were as follows:  
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decision-
making process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show 
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”  
Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked to respond True or False to the following 
question: “The plea Michael was offered required him to admit guilt and accept responsibility for 
the crime.”  
As a combined attention and manipulation check, participants were asked to state the 
sentence offered to the defendant as part of the plea (6 months prison time). Participants who 
failed two or more checks were ultimately removed from the study.  
Hypotheses  
H1. I hypothesized that Michael would be perceived as less guilty if he accepted an 
Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional guilty plea, based on him maintaining his 
innocence. 
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H2. I further predicted that the effect described above would be particularly pronounced if 
Michael initiated the Alford plea. 
H3. As with studies 3 and 4, I hypothesized that Michael would receive more positive 
perception ratings when he accepted an Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional 
plea, in particular if he initiated it.  
Results 
The current study had an exceedingly high rate of exclusions based on the Alford 
manipulation check, with 65.9% of participants in the Alford-defendant initiated condition failing 
the check. The manipulation check asked participants whether or not the plea offered required the 
defendant to admit guilt. It is likely this added condition, in which participants were initially 
offered a traditional plea followed by an Alford plea, further increased the ambiguity of the 
manipulation check question. Participants may not have understood which plea the question was 
referring to, as the initial plea required the defendant to admit guilt and the Alford plea did not. 
Due to the potentially added ambiguity, the results based on the sample both with and without 
participants who failed the check is presented for the main analysis on guilt perceptions. The 
remaining dependent measures did not result in significantly different outcomes when using the 
full sample and the sample who passed the manipulation check and therefore only analyses on the 
full sample are reported. 
Guilt Perceptions  
Overall, 50.6% of 401 participants believed the defendant was guilty. A chi-square on 
perceptions of guilt showed no significant difference between the conditions, Χ2(2) = 4.22, p = 
.121, Cramer’s V = .103 (see Table 41). I also conducted this main analysis on the reduced 
sample of 261 once all participants who failed the manipulation check were removed 
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(Traditional: n = 135, Alford: n = 79, Alford initiated by defendant: n = 47). Within this sample, 
a significant effect was obtained, Χ2(2) = 15.4, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .243. When the defendant 
accepted a traditional plea, 57.8% of participants believed he was guilty. When he accepted an 
Alford plea, this number went down to 43% (Χ2(1) = 4.34, p = .037, Cramer’s V = .142 (OR = 
1.81, 95% CI [1.03, 3.17]). When the defendant initiated the Alford plea, however, only 25.5% of 
participants believed he was guilty, which was significantly lower than both the traditional plea, 
Χ2(1) = 14.5, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .282, (OR = 3.99, 95% CI [1.91, 8.36]), and the standard 
Alford plea, Χ2(1) = 3.90, p = .048, Cramer’s V = .176 (OR = 2.20, 95% CI [.998, 4.87]; see 
Figure 5).  
Then I conducted the guilt perception analysis once more with only the participants who 
failed the manipulation check. Since no participants from the traditional plea condition failed the 
check, this was primarily a comparison between participants in the prosecutor-initiated Alford 
condition and the defendant-initiated Alford condition. A chi-square revealed no significant 
differences, Χ2(1) = .102, p = .750, Cramer’s V = .027, (OR = .894, 95% CI [.449, 1.78]). The 
pattern amongst those participants who failed the check was different compared to those both the 
full sample and those participants who passed the manipulation check (See Table 41). 
Participants in the Alford initiated by defendant condition were more likely to believe the 
defendant was guilty (35.7%) compared to those in the standard Alford plea condition (20.7%) 
 Overall, participants were generally confident in their beliefs (M = 6.98, SD = 2.08). 
Using the full sample again, I submitted confidence ratings to a one-way ANOVA with the three 
plea conditions as the independent variables. No significant effects were found, F(2, 398) = .734, 
p = .481, η2p = .004. 
Plea Decision Perceptions 
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 Overall, participants were moderately likely to believe the defendant had made the right 
decision (M = 6.10, SD = 2.59). A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects, F(2, 398) = 
1.75, p = .175, η2p = .009 (see Table 42).  
 Imagining themselves in the same position as the defendant, 56.1% of participants said 
they would have accepted the plea, 43.9% said they would have rejected it. No significant 
differences were found across conditions, Χ2(2) = .090, p = .956, Cramer’s V = .015 (see Table 
43).  
Fairness of Plea 
Participants were asked to rate how fair they believed the plea offered to the defendant 
was. Overall, participants’ ratings fell above the midpoint (M = 6.13, SD = 2.61). A one-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant effects, F(2, 398) = .680, p = .507, η2p = .003. 
Perceptions of the Defendant 
Next, participants rated their perceptions of the defendant on a number of characteristics. 
The composite stigma score was not significantly influenced by plea condition, F(2, 398) = 1.07, 
p = .344, η2p = .005. Likewise, the was no significant impact of plea condition of the remaining 
individual trait measures (competence, intelligence, confidence, friendliness, and honesty) and 
defendant blameworthiness (see Table 44 for means and statistics). 
On perceptions of the defendant’s remorsefulness, a significant effect was found, F(2, 
398) = 8.52, p < .001, η2p = .041, such that participants perceived the defendant as more 
remorseful when he accepted a traditional plea (M = 4.11, SD = 2.1), compared to when he had 
accepted an Alford plea he had initiated t(389) = -4.12, p < .001, (M = 3.64, SD = 1.03). When 
the defendant accepted an Alford plea initiated by the prosecutor, participants did not rate him 
differently from the other two conditions (M = 3.89, SD = .918).   
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Correlations. Table 45 presents correlations among dependent measures. Compared to 
Studies 3 and 4, Study 5 revealed more negative correlations with guilt perceptions. For example, 
those who perceived the defendant as guilty were less likely to believe the plea offer was fair, and 
less likely to report they would have made the same decision. However, remorsefulness had no 
significant relationship with this variable. Perceptions of remorse was instead associated with 
positive perceptions overall, similar to Study 4. 
Summary  
Few effects were found in Study 5. But considering only those participants who passed 
the Alford manipulation check which asked participants to verify whether the plea that defendant 
was offered required him to admit guilt or not, I found that when the defendant initiated an 
Alford plea, he was significantly less likely to be seen as guilty compared to both a traditional 
plea and a plea initiated by the prosecutor. With the full sample, I further found that participants 
perceived the defendant to be the least remorseful when he initiated an Alford plea, consistent 
with the findings from studies 3 and 4. 
General Discussion 
As Alschuler’s (2003) quote at the opening implies, the Alford plea is a controversial 
practice that inspires strong feelings from legal scholars (Alschuler, 2003; Conklin, 2020). Some 
scholars herald Alford as a beneficial alternative for innocent individuals, giving them both the 
advantage of large plea discounts and the ability to proclaim their innocence to preserve their 
reputation and positive self-regard (Ronis, 2009). Others assert that the Alford plea is coercive 
and unconstitutional and often bears unknown collateral consequences (Bibas, 2003). At present, 
no empirical data exist to support either side of this debate. The current set of studies represent 
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the first attempts to further explore the decision-making process defendants are faced with when 
offered Alford pleas, and how they are perceived by observers. 
Study 1 and 2: Actors 
My hypotheses for studies 1 and 2 were partially supported. Consistent with common 
sense and much previous research, guilty participants were significantly more likely in both 
studies to accept a plea compared to innocent participants. As would be expected in light of 
research on the illusion of transparency (Gilovitch & Kavitsky, 1999), these participants were 
also likely to believe their guilt would be obvious to observers. 
Still, in Study 1, 22.9% of innocent participants accepted a plea, while 24.6% did so in 
Study 2. These numbers are consistent with previous research (Redlich et al. 2017), as well as 
data from the National Registry of Exonerations. There are scholars who argue that while the 
innocence problem in plea bargaining may be real, its magnitude is much too small to warrant 
any significant changes to the system (Tor et al., 2010; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2011). However, the 
current finding adds to the literature on false guilty pleas, and supports the argument that the 
innocence problem is, in fact, a real problem. Although it is difficult to discern the true number of 
innocent defendants pleading guilty in the field, the fact that research such as the present studies 
finds that close to 1 in 4 innocent individuals are willing to plead guilty in a hypothetical vignette 
context should raise concern. This result, along with previous similar findings, suggests the 
number of false guilty pleas in the field are likely much higher than the current numbers show.  
Next, I predicted that the Alford plea would make innocent participants more likely to 
plead. However, Study 1 revealed the opposite: innocent participants offered an Alford plea were 
the least likely to plead. Perhaps the offer to maintain innocence made their innocence more 
salient to them, which made the decision to reject the plea easier to make. Interestingly, I found 
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opposite patterns for innocent and guilty participants with regard to the Alford plea. While a 
traditional plea was more appealing to innocent defendants, the opposite was true for guilty 
participants who were more likely to accept an Alford plea. This pattern could be explained by 
looking at self-presentation theories, specifically strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 
1982). Guilty participants, who already were more likely to accept a plea, may have found the 
Alford plea more appealing due to the ability to self-present in a more positive way (i.e., by 
maintaining innocence).  
Participants’ responses to the open-ended questions regarding the reasons for their plea 
decision revealed further indication of self-presentation at work. Across studies 1 and 2, two of 
the most frequently mentioned rationales referred to participants’ guilt status. More than a third 
of innocent participants stated their innocence as the rationale behind their decision, whereas 
more than a third of guilty participants suggested that their guilt was the reason for their plea 
decision. These finding are in line with theories on self-verification (Swann et al., 1987) as 
participants seem to be concerned with presenting themselves in ways that are consistent with 
their self-view, as indicated by their responses.  
Some participants’ elaborations further lent support to the idea of self-verification, in 
particular for innocent participants. For example, one participant stated: “I rejected the offered 
deal because I knew I was innocent. If I just accepted the deal I would be seen as a liar and 
cheater, which I am not.” This participant clearly stated that they do not view themselves as a liar 
and cheater and that accepting a plea would be a stark contrast to that self-view. Another 
participant wrote “I myself know that I was not speeding and that I am innocent. My innocence 
would come through in my statement. I will stick to my guns and if I have to go to prison for 
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longer at least I will know that I am innocent.” This response demonstrates how important both 
innocence and others’ recognition of innocence is for the participant.  
Guilty participants were more likely to cite the importance of honesty and owning up to 
one’s actions. One participant asserted:” I am an honest person and would feel guilty if I lied 
hoping to get less time for something I know I did not do (speeding). This response could further 
demonstrate a preference for self-verification as they acknowledge the self-view that they are an 
honest person and much therefore act accordingly by accepting a plea.  
As predicted, innocent participants who accepted an Alford plea said they were influenced 
by the opportunity to maintain their innocence (to a higher degree than did guilty participants, 
though very few articulated a concern with how others would view them). In fact, only Alford 
participants who were innocent and who accepted this plea cited this reason. Although only a 
small portion of Alford participants elaborated on this in their open-ended responses (10 in Study 
1, 15 in Study 2), the ones who did spoke of how the ability to maintain innocence made the plea 
decision easier to make. As one participant put it: “Additionally, being able to leave that letter in 
the file saying that although I am innocent, I am pleading guilty helped ease my mind a little on if 
it was the right call.” Another participant stated:” The ability to write on my record that I'm 
innocent in my intentions. This would at least make me feel better when there's a way for me to 
"explain" what happened when someone looks at my record. It may not make a difference when 
someone is checking my record but it gives me a certain peace of mind.”  
The mentions of “ease my mind” and “peace of mind” suggest the possibility that these 
participants might have felt some cognitive dissonance when faced with making a plea decision, 
and that the opportunity to claim innocence via an Alford plea helped reduce this dissonance. 
Although it is difficult to draw conclusions from these limited comments or discern the exact 
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mechanism behind these statements, future research should make efforts to tease this apart. 
Future studies could combine methodologies from the plea-bargaining literature as well as from 
traditional dissonance reduction literature (e.g., Steele & Lieu, 1983). 
Interestingly, participants presented with an Alford plea found the decision harder to 
make and reported greater pressure to make a decision, especially if they were innocent. These 
findings make sense in the light of decision-making literature that discusses the competence 
hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991) and ambiguity aversion (Fox & Tversky, 1995). Taken 
together, this research suggests that individuals find decision making more difficult and 
unpleasant when they are unfamiliar with the choices and the outcomes (Keren & Gerritsen, 
1999).  
Previous research has shown that the Alford plea is unknown to most laypeople (Hellgren 
& Kassin, 2018). A decision about this option would therefore arguably be a decision made in a 
state of uncertainty, which is further supported by Study 2 findings showing that Alford 
participants were less confident in their decision than those faced with a traditional plea. The 
uncertainty of an Alford plea is made especially clear in contrast to a traditional plea where the 
choices are fairly clear: admit guilt or fight for your innocence. The introduction of the ability to 
proclaim innocence in an Alford plea likely creates uncertainty and ambiguity, making an Alford 
plea decision a more difficult choice.   
An additional goal of utilizing both a vignette describing the cheating paradigm and an 
actual criminal charge was to compare how the stakes of the wrongdoing described influenced 
participants’ decisions. In contrast to my hypotheses, there were some differences between Study 
1 and 2. Although the overall plea rate was identical across the two studies, type of plea seemed 
to have little influence. In Study 2, participants rated the crime as much more severe (8.6) 
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compared to Study 1 (5.2). As such, this difference in the severity of the alleged offense may 
have contributed to the lack of effects. Perhaps participants’ view of the crime as more severe 
made them less influenced by the small differences in what the different types of pleas offered. 
An additional explanation could be the participants in Study 1, who were all college students, 
were able to immerse themselves in the hypothetical to a higher extent since the cheating vignette 
was more self-relevant to them than a crime vignette would be to most participants in Study 2. As 
a result, they may have weighed all factors of the case and the plea offer more carefully.   
Study 3 and 4: Observers 
As with the first two studies, my hypotheses for Study 3 and 4 were partially supported. 
Consistent with my prediction and previous research, the defendant was significantly more likely 
to be seen as guilty when he accepted a plea compared to when he rejected one. This result is in 
line with research on perceptions of false confessors and observers’ reliance on the fundamental 
attribution error (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). If a person takes responsibility for a 
crime, be it through a confession or a guilty plea, observers assume the only reason they would 
do so is actual guilt. As one would expect, perceptions of guilt were associated with more 
negative overall perceptions of the defendant.   
Despite this consistent result across Study 3 and 4 regarding guilt perceptions, 
participants’ views of the defendant’s decision differed widely between the two studies. When 
the defendant rejected a plea, participants were more likely to believe that he made the right 
decision and that they would make the same decision, compared to when the defendant accepted 
a plea. In contrast, Study 4 participants were more likely to report that the defendant had made 
the right decision and that they would make the same decision, when he accepted a plea. This is 
not an unsurprising result. Clearly, the potential consequences for the defendant in Study 3 
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(academic sanctions and community service), were far less serious than the consequences in 
Study 4 (a criminal record and prison time). As such, it is understandable that participants in 
Study 3 would perceive both the offense and consequences as relatively minor and be more likely 
to believe that the defendant should fight his case. Alternatively, participants may have been 
more likely to see involuntary manslaughter as morally repugnant and something for which the 
defendant should take responsibility. Even when they saw the defendant as guilty due to his plea 
acceptance, participants believed he was right to accept the plea offer (Study 2). Perhaps this was 
due to the nature of the crime; the involuntary manslaughter case was unsurprisingly rated as 
more severe (compared to the cheating), and observers may have wanted to see the defendant 
owning up to his crime by accepting guilt.  
Although both Study 3 and 4 revealed a significant relationship between perceptions of 
guilt and remorse, the direction of the relationship was different across the two studies. In Study 
3, participants who perceived the student defendant to be innocent, also viewed him as less 
remorseful. This result could be explained simply by the fact that an innocent defendant has no 
wrongdoing to express remorse for. However, participants in Study 4 who believed the defendant 
was innocent perceived him to be more remorseful. A possible explanation for these surprising 
results is that the crime committed in Study 4 (involuntary manslaughter) led to a person’s death, 
regardless of whether the defendant was culpable or not. Although this does not fully explain 
why innocence was associate with lower remorse, it at least elucidates why the direction of the 
relationship differed between Study 3 and 4.  
Interesting differences were also found between actor and observer studies based on the 
difference between the cheating and crime vignettes. As noted, Study 1 and 2 yielded identical 
plea acceptance rates (51.2%) even though the consequences of acceptance varied a great deal. 
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But in the observer studies, participants seemed to be more influenced by the varying severity 
and consequences of the plea as described above. This discrepancy suggests that actors are less 
influenced by the variation in stakes than observers, a result perhaps best explained by actor-
observer differences in attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett et al., 1973; Saulnier & 
Perlman, 1981; for a meta-analysis indicating the limits of this phenomenon, see Malle, 2006). 
 Essentially, participants’ report of what personal decision they would make (actor 
studies) was different from the decisions they believe others should make (observer studies); 
Whereas the actors’ plea decisions were ostensibly influenced by both internal factors (such as 
each individual participants’ risk tolerance) and external factors (such as the participants’ 
evaluation of the consequences of accepting vs. rejecting a plea), observers seemed to be of the 
opinion that the defendant should only consider the “objective” risks of the consequences. This 
interpretation of the results aligns with the actor-observer effect—that people are more likely to 
make dispositional attributes to other’s actions but external attributes to their own actions.  
In the actor studies, participants may also have been more motivated to advocate for 
themselves in these hypotheticals. As a result, the severity of the crime is not as much of an 
influencing factor. However, from a more detached point of view, observers were more likely to 
moralize and be influenced by how the severity of the wrongdoing and the consequences should 
impact the defendant’s decision making. This is further supported by the fact that when 
participants judged the defendant’s plea decision to be the right decision (reject in Study 3, accept 
in Study 4), they were also more likely to report that their personal plea decision would have 
been the same. However, in the actor studies, I did not find these discrepancies, which suggests 
that the observers’ judgement of what a defendant should do does not align with what actors 
actually end up doing.  
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In contrast to my predictions, the Alford plea had little to no impact on observers’ guilt 
perceptions. However, consistently across the three observer studies, Alford defendants were 
seen in a more negative light compared to other defendants. Several legal scholars have argued 
that one of the primary benefits of an Alford plea is the ability to preserve one’s reputation and 
avoid negative judgement from the public (Conklin, 2020; Ronis, 2009). However, the current 
studies produced consistent results showing quite the opposite. In Study 1, Alford defendants 
were rated more negatively on several personality dimensions compared to other defendants. In 
addition, Alford participants were seen as less remorseful than other defendants consistently 
across the observer studies suggesting that they were perceived as guilty but not taking 
responsibility, an indication of lack of remorse. These findings suggest that instead of 
destigmatizing defendants, the Alford plea may have exacerbated a presumption of guilt This is 
an important result as the Alford plea is sometimes touted as an alternative to the traditional plea 
with no additional negative consequences. While the legal consequences may be the same, the 
current findings suggest that public opinion, which can have consequences down the line, are 
different between Alford pleas and traditional pleas.  
Beyond the consistent finding that Alford defendants are seen as less remorseful than 
other defendants, Study 5 revealed few significant effects. A potential reason for this could be the 
high rate of participants who failed a manipulation check aimed specifically at ensuring 
participants’ understanding of the ability to maintain innocence in the two Alford conditions (this 
will be discussed further below). In the condition in which the defendant initiated the Alford plea, 
a large number of participants failed this check. 
Considering only those participants who passed this manipulation check, the findings 
were consistent with my hypothesis as defendants who initiated an Alford plea were seen as 
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significantly more likely to be innocent compared to the other defendants. Although this result 
was based on a smaller subsample of participants, the effect size was strong (Cramer’s V = .282). 
That said, the effect size obtained represents a weak association. Furthermore, seeing as this 
result went against the pattern across the other studies which further added to the difficulty in 
drawing any strong conclusions, future research should utilize larger sample sizes and more 
robust manipulation checks to avoid this issue. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present studies explored the Alford plea and the inferences that actors and observers 
draw from it. This research is limited in important ways. In part because of changes to data 
collection forced by the COVID-19 pandemic, several redesigns and compromises had to be 
made. For example, the original plan was to conduct the actors study using the cheating paradigm 
in a lab. Videos of these live sessions would then have provided stimulus materials for observer 
studies. Instead, all five studies had to move online using a hypothetical role-playing paradigm. 
As described in the introduction, hypothetical vignette studies are inherently limited due to their 
lack in mundane realism. For Study 1 and 3, students were recruited in an attempt to enhance 
participants’ ability to immerse themselves in the hypothetical scenario, according to the research 
that shows that vignettes that are self-relevant heightens the realism of the hypothetical for 
participants (Hughes, 1998). Of course, this does not fully solve the issue. Future research should 
utilize laboratory studies in order to enhance “experimental realism” in which the participants 
have a stake in the decisions they make (see Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968). This would enable 
researchers to further examine the effect of the Alford plea on decision making. However, despite 
these limitations, I found false guilty plea rates equal to those in similar studies (Redlich et al., 
2017), a fact that is both interesting and disturbing. As such, future studies should explore how 
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different hypothetical vignettes with varying levels of relevancy to the participants influence false 
guilty plea rates.  
Another limitation of the current studies was the main manipulation check and its high 
failure rate. The purpose of the manipulation check was to ensure that participants understood 
what the Alford plea entailed and recognized the ability to proclaim innocence as a part of the 
plea. Because so many participants failed this manipulation check, it is difficult to discern what 
portion of the sample that fully understood this. One issue of this manipulation check was its 
ambiguity. Participants were asked to answer a true/false question regarding whether they (in 
actor studies) or the defendant (in observer studies) were required to admit guilt as a part of their 
plea. As the claim of innocence manipulation was at the end of the Alford vignette following a 
description similar to that of a traditional plea, perhaps participants misunderstood the question 
and assumed all plea required the admission of guilt.  
This possibility is further supported by the findings of a follow-up study aimed at 
comparing the original manipulation check with a less ambiguous question, asking if the plea 
enabled them (or the defendant in observer studies) to proclaim innocence as a part of the plea. In 
this study, 59% of participants failed the original manipulation check, while only about 10% 
failed the improved one.  
Another potentially important explanation beyond the ambiguity of the original 
manipulation check questions, is that few laypeople are aware of what the Alford plea is to begin 
with. As such, some participants may simply not have registered the ability to maintain innocence 
as this is not familiar to them. Participant comments illustrate this, as one participant stated “I 
found it hard to believe he would get an offer where he was claiming innocence but pleading 
guilty. I think the court would have a hard time accepting such a plea.” This is consistent with 
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previous research which has found evidence of the Alford pleas being both unfamiliar and against 
common sense (Kassin & Hellgren, 2018). Thus, it may have been the ambiguity of the Alford 
plea as a concept, rather than the ambiguity of the manipulation check question, that caused the 
high failure rate. As such, researchers should take great care in constructing Alford manipulations 
in future studies to ensure participants fully grasp the nuances of an Alford plea.  
An additional limitation is that the participant samples were predominantly 
White/European American which does not represent the realities of the criminal justice system. It 
is widely known that people of color are greatly overrepresented and treated differently by legal 
actors compared to their White counterparts (Kutateladze et al., 2014). There is also reason to 
believe that people of color would look at the hypotheticals used in the current studies differently 
as they could perceive their race and/or ethnicity as an additional risk factor leading to more 
severe consequences. In fact, one participant cited their ethnicity as the reason for why they 
accepted a plea and avoided the risk of trial. Furthermore, previous research has shown that Black 
defendants are less likely to plead compared to White defendants (Lee & Richardson, 2020), but 
the question remains whether the Alford plea could influence this plea rate. Because of the 
limited diversity of the current samples, the findings in the presented studies have limited 
generalizability to all ethnicities and races. Future research should make efforts to remedy this 
limitation by utilizing more diverse samples.  
Furthermore, just as students in Study 1 and 3 may have had an easier time putting 
themselves in the hypothetical vignette since it was relevant to them (due to the university 
setting), it would be important and interesting to use participants who have some level of 
experience with the justice system in future studies. Although I asked participants if they had 
ever been arrested, the rates of people who responded in the positive were too small to conduct 
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any analyses or make any meaningful inferences. Future research should make efforts to sample 
participants who are both more diverse in race/ethnicity and criminal justice experience. More 
diverse observers in both experience and race/ethnicity may also reveal interesting results in 
future research. For example, recruiting samples of legal actors (e.g., defense attorneys, appellate 
judges) would likely yield result different from the current study. Furthermore, the observers’ 
relationship to the observed defendant could be manipulated to further explore how the Alford 
plea influences perceptions.  
Finally, future research should explore the unique decision-making process that takes 
place when wrongfully convicted individuals are faced with the opportunity of an Alford plea. 
Prosecutors often use the Alford plea a tool in cases where a wrongfully convicted individual has 
been granted re-trial and they want to avoid dismissal of the case (as in the cases of Joe Buffey 
and the West Memphis Three). As can be expected, many individuals who have spent years, if 
not decades incarcerated, are persuaded by the offer of a quick resolution to their case and the 
promise of no more prison time. On its surface, the Alford plea can seem as a viable alternative 
as these individuals can state their innocence for the record. But it is important to remember that 
an Alford plea is not an exoneration and bars these individuals from, among other things, 
receiving compensation from the state. In addition, based on the current findings, Alford 
defendants are subject to more wide-spread stigma compared to defendants accepting traditional 
pleas. Seeing as individuals who get fully exonerated still face many issues both in terms of 
reintegration and support in society, as well as public opinion (Clow & Leach, 2015; Kukucka & 
Evolo, 2018), the current findings give further support for the notion that an Alford plea is not a 
beneficial alternative and may be best avoided. 
Conclusions and Implications 
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The present studies represent the first empirical exploration of the elusive Alford plea. 
While the five studies presented offered some answers, there are many interesting and exciting 
avenues left to explore. This project represents only the first venture, and it is my hope it will 
further inspire and facilitate future empirical research on this traditionally ignored topic. 
Ideally, the current findings would be widely disseminated and assist with the goal of not 
only informing the public of the Alford plea and its effects on observer perceptions, but also 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who view the Alford plea as a viable alternative way 
to resolve cases. A number of law reviews have critically discussed the Alford plea but with little 
consensus as to its uses and disadvantages (Bibas, 2003; Diehm, 2015; Ronis, 2009). Even the 
most experienced legal actors seem to underestimate the prevalence of usage, as evidenced by a 
recent podcast episode in which a highly experienced federal judge was interviewed regarding the 
Alford plea (Holloway, 2020). This judge explained that the Alford plea is exceedingly rare and 
was surprised to learn how often the defense attorney host regularly oversees Alford pleas in his 
legal practice. The true prevalence of the Alford plea is still difficult to discern due to limited 
official statistics. Efforts should be made to create a national database to aid both researchers and 
legal actors in better understanding the usage and pervasiveness of this plea.  
Although I did not find the Alford plea to increase the rate of innocent participants 
choosing to plea as predicted, the Alford plea did seem to appeal to guilty participants. Out of the 
participants offered an Alford plea, 83.3% in Study 1 and 79% in Study 2 accepted it. At first 
glance, these results do not seem troubling. What harm would it do if guilty individuals get to 
maintain their innocence while accepting a plea? But it is important to consider unintended 
consequences, such as the risk of increased negative judgement by the public.  
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Just beyond the 50th anniversary of the Alford plea, there is more we need to understand 
regarding the impact of this plea on both actors and observers. Further research and a better 
appreciation of Alford’s mechanisms will help both future defendants and attorneys make more 
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Table 1 
Demographics (counts and percentages) across conditions (Study 1). 
                         Guilty                                            Innocent 
 Traditional  Alford Traditional  Alford 
Gender     
Female 59 (28.9) 43 (23) 58 (28.4) 57 (30.5) 
Male 40 (19.6) 43 (23) 41 (20.1) 531 (16.6) 
Non-binary 3 (1.5) 10 (5.3) 1 (.5) 2 (1.1) 
Prefer not to say 1 (.5) 0 (0) 1 (.5) 1 (.5) 
Race/Ethnicity     
Latinx/Hispanic 
Heritage 
19 (9.3) 17 (9.1) 19 (9.3) 9 (4.8) 
African American/Black 12 (5.9) 8 (4.3) 12 (5.9) 11 (5.9) 
Native 
American/Indigenous 
1 (.5) 0 (0) 1 (.5) 0 (0) 




24 (12.8) 42 (10.7) 20 (10.7) 39 (10) 
White/European 
American 
47 (25.1) 95 (24.3) 42 (22.5) 87 (22.3) 
Biracial/Multiracial 0 (0) 3 (1.5) 4 (2) 7 (3.7) 
Other 1 (.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 
Age     
Mean (SD) 21.8 (5.11) 22.8 (7.30) 23.2 (6.19) 22.2 (4.21) 
Arrest Record     
Percentage Arrested 3% 4.8% 6.9% 2.1% 
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Table 2 
Percentage of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent Total 
Traditional 73.8% 26.7% 50.5% 
Alford 83.3% 16.7% 51.9% 
Total 78.2%a 22.9%a  
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p > 
.001). 
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Table 3 
Categories for plea decision reasoning (Study 1 and 2) 
Category  
1.The opportunity to maintain innocence  
2. The opportunity to appear innocent to others  
3. I am innocent/I am not at fault  
4. I was guilty/I wanted to take responsibility for my actions  
5. To avoid more severe consequences/uncertainty  
6. To get the process over with  
7. To avoid criminal record  
8. The consequences were not too bad  
9. I want to argue my case/The truth will come out at trial  
10. No/not enough evidence against me  
11. A lawyer will help me  
12. Evidence will exonerate me  
13. Too much evidence against me/no evidence of my innocence  
14. Too extreme/It’s just a study  
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Table 4 
Examples of reasons for plea decision (Study 1 and 2) 
  Study 1 Study 2 
Category  Example Example 
To avoid more severe 
consequences/uncertainty 
 “I did not want to take the chances 
to get a larger 
sentence/punishment. The plea 
was guarantee with the 
punishment while the court 
hearing could go either way.” 
“My reasons to accept 
the deal is because 
although I am innocent 6 
months in jail is better 
than losing the trial and 
ending up with 5 years 
of jail time.” 
I am innocent/I am not at 
fault 
 “I reject the offered deal because I 
did not cheat. I should not be 
prosecuted for something I did not 
do.” 
“I didn't do anything 
wrong - I was sober and 
driving slow! And my 
life would be ruined 
spending 6 months in 
jail. I would hire a good 
lawyer though!” 
I was guilty/I wanted to 
take responsibility for my 
actions 
 “I was guilty of cheating. The 
adverse impact on the research, 
which was carefully thought 
through, planned, and 
implemented by the researchers in 
advance of the study was known 
to me” 
“I would sign the offered 
deal because I was being 
reckless. I will feel guilt 
for the rest of my life but 
I'd feel guiltier if I didn't 
hold myself 
accountable.” 
Take my case to 
“trial”/The truth will 
come out 
 “I'm not going to endure 
punishment for something I didn't 
do. I am willing to go to court 
because I know I'm in the right 
here, there's no reason for them to 
actually punish me.” 
“The facts of the case 
deserve to be heard and 
cross examined in front 
of a jury of my peers. If 
I'm clearly innocent, by 
my own firsthand 
knowledge, then a plea 
should never be 
accepted. That is 
tantamount to admitting 
guilt for something one 
did not do.” 
For Alford conditions: 
Ability to maintain 
innocence. 
 “I chose to accept because I did 
provide assistance to the other 
participant despite being told not 
to. I accepted the deal because I 
was allowed to state on record that 
I was not guilty while accepting 
consequences. It seemed like a fair 
middle ground.” 
“I’m signing to take the 
deal because I want a 
statement of innocence 
put on my record.” 
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Table 5 
Participants’ reasoning behind plea decision broken down by plea decision, guilt status, and type 
of plea (Study 1 and 2) 
Study 1  
                         Guilty                                            Innocent 
 Traditional  Alford Traditional  Alford 
 % % % % 
Accept     
To avoid harsher  81.6 60 60 82.4 
I was innocent 0 3.8 7.4 5.9 
I was guilty 48.7 55 14.8 5.9 
Opportunity to maintain 
innocence 
0 5 0 35.5 
Reject     
To avoid harsher 0 6.3 1.4 4.1 
I was innocent 22.2 12.5 82.4 77 
I was guilty 0 25 1.4 0 
Opportunity to maintain 
innocence 




                         Guilty                                            Innocent 
 Traditional  Alford Traditional  Alford 
 % % % % 
Accept     
To avoid harsher  26.6 29.1 82.6 66.7 
I was innocent 0 0 0 0 
I was guilty 52.6 57.5 18.5 5.9 
Opportunity to maintain 
innocence 
0 7.6 0 33.3 
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Reject     
To avoid harsher 0 0 1.3 0 
I was innocent 12.5 19 71.8 68 
I was guilty 0 25 1.4 0 
Opportunity to maintain 
innocence 
0 0 0 0 
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Table 6 
Means and ANOVA statistics for effects of type of plea and guilt status on confidence in plea 
decision ratings (Study 1 and 2) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Study 1        
Type of Plea   G .489 1 .030 .001 
  Traditional 7.32 (2.11) 7.46 (2.20) T .812 1 .445 .002 
  Alford 7.09 (2.26) 7.27 (2.26) G x T .919 1 .781 < .001 
`Study 2 
Type of Plea   G .888 1 .346 .002 
  Traditional 7.06 (2.39) 6.76 (2.48) T 4.389* 1 .037 .011 
  Alford 6.48 (2.41) 6.31 (2.59) G x T .426 1 .792 < .001 
Note. G = guilt status. T = type of plea. *p <.05 
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Table 7 
Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt (vs. innocence) perceptions by observers by type of 
plea and guilt status (Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent 
Traditional 69.7 (23.3) 41.1 (24.1) 
Alford 75 (23.3) 41 (23.5) 
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Table 8 
Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea and 
guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea 
(Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 34.807* 1 < .001 .151 
  Traditional 74.34 (20.02) 52.22 
(24.23) 
T 1.232 1 .268 .006 
  Alford 78.38 (21.39) 56.47 
(22.34) 




  G 23.199* 1 < .001 .110 
  Traditional 56.67 (27.18) 37.03 
(22.86) 
T .050 1 .824 < .001 
  Alford 58.13 (25.09) 37.43 
(22.46) 
G x T .016 1 .900 < .001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001 
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Table 9 
Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 1) 
                         Guilty                                            Innocent 
 Traditional  Alford Traditional  Alford 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Difficulty 5.11 (2.67) 5.04 (2.53) 4.80 (2.77) 5.81 (2.79) 
Satisfaction 6.17 (2.26) 5.75 (2.49) 6.42 (3.06) 6.43 (2.62) 
Pressure 7.28 (2.78) 7.83 (2.25) 6.56 (2.98) 7.43 (2.67) 
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Table 10 
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status, split between 
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 17.340* 1 < .001 .081 
  Traditional 5.00 (2.53) 6.30 (1.98) T .731 1 .394 .004 




  G 1.868 1 .173 .010 
  Traditional 5.41 (3.08) 4.26 (2.82) T 2.484 1 .117  .013 
  Alford 5.75 (2.91) 5.51 (2.79) G x T .811 1 .369 .004 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001 
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Table 11 
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt status on 
satisfaction ratings (Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Type of Plea   G 2.984 1 .085 .008 
  Traditional 6.17 (2.26) 6.42 
(3.06) 
T .604 1 .437 .002 
  Alford 5.75 (2.49) 6.42 
(2.62) 
G x T .615 1 .434 .002 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea.  
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Table 12 
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt status, split 
between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 5.157* 1 .024 .026 
  Traditional 6.30 (2.26) 4.89 (2.94) T .781 1 .378 .004 
  Alford 5.49 (2.49) 4.94 (2.59) G x T 1.01 1 .316 .005 
Reject 
Type of Plea   G .930 1 .343 .005 
  Traditional 5.78 (2.26) 6.97 (2.93) T 1.302 1 .255 .007 
  Alford 7.06 (2.14) 6.76 (2.53) G x T 2.570 1 .111 .014 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05 
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Table 13 
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status, split between 
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G .133 1 .716 .001 
  Traditional 7.51 (2.72) 6.85 (2.78) T 3.481 1 .064 .017 
  Alford 7.84 (2.24) 8.18 (2.58) G x T 1.281 1 .259 .006 
Reject 
Type of Plea   G 3.849 1 .051 .003 
  Traditional 6.63 (2.88) 6.46 (3.06) T .517 1 .473 .020 
  Alford 7.81 (2.37) 7.26 (2.67) G x T .146 1 703 .001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .051 
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Table 14 
Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on case evaluation measures (Study 1) 
 
              Guilty                     Innocent      
 Trad.  Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Crime 
Severity 
4.74 4.79 5.44 5.79  G 8.164* 1 .005 .021 
 (3.01) (2.65) (2.98) (2.96) T .475 1 .491 .001 
     G x T .258 1 .612 .001 
Strength of  5.25 6.20 3.12 3.58 G 106.01* 1 <.001 .215 
Evidence (2.46) (2.29) (2.16) (2.16) T 9.33 1 .002 .024 
     G x T 1.09 1 .297 .003 
Likelihood 
of  
59.4 71.2 42.2 44.7 G 58.83* 1 <.001 .132 
Conviction (30.6) (21.9) (34.9) (25.7) T 5.21 1 .023 .013 
     G x T 3.09 1 .080 .008 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05 
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Table 15 
Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 1)  
 Guilty Innocent      
 Trad. Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Consequences  7.90 7.48 5.17 6.04 G 58.36* 1 <.001 .131 
of rejecting 
plea 
(2.39) (2.56) (3.11) (2.66)  T .658 1 .408 .002 
     G x T 5.667* 1 .018 .011 
Consequences  6.25 6.78 5.31 5.91 G 11.452* 1 <.001 .029 
of accepting 
plea 
(2.63) (2.51) (2.83) (2.60)  T 4.473* 1 .035 .024 
     G x T .023 1 .887 <.001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  106 
 
Table 17 
Percentages of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent Total 
Traditional 76.7% 22.8% 50% 
Alford 79% 26.5% 50% 
Total 77.8%a 24.6%a  
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p > 
.001). 
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Table 18 
Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea and guilt 
status (Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent 
Traditional 74.2 (22.1) 47.6 (25.1) 
Alford 70.5 (21.7) 45.5 (23.8) 
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Table 19 
Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea and 
guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participants who rejected a plea 
(Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 17.531* 1  .151 
  Traditional 82.91 (13.60) 67.83 
(22.55) 
T 2.078 1  .010 
  Alford 75.57 (18.03) 67.04 
(19.96) 
G x T 1.349 1  .007 
Reject 
Type of Plea   G 5.667* 1 .018 .028 
  Traditional 45.42 (20.21) 41.67 
(22.70) 
T .080 1 .777 < .001 
  Alford 51.43 (23.93) 37.73 
(20.04) 
G x T 1.842 1 .176 .009 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05 
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Table 20 
Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 2) 
                         Guilty                                            Innocent 
 Traditional  Alford Traditional  Alford 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Difficulty 6.43 (3.01) 6.63 (3.05) 7.11 (3.04) 7.12 (2.72) 
Satisfaction 6.05 (2.65) 5.72 (2.45) 5.69 (2.96) 5.52 (2.67) 
Pressure 7.23 (2.81) 7.74 (2.44) 6.62 (2.82) 7.31 (2.65) 
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Table 21 
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status, split between 
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 10.215* 1 .002 .048 
  Traditional 6.16 (3.03) 8.48 (2.33) T 1.126 1 .290 .005 
  Alford 6.44 (3.08) 7.19 (2.67) G x T 2.702 1 .102 .013 
Reject 
Type of Plea   G .690 1 .407 .004 
  Traditional 7.29 (2.82) 6.71 (3.12) T .187 1 .666 .001 
  Alford 7.33 (2.92) 7.09 (2.75) G x T .121 1 .728 .001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .01 
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Table 22 
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt status on 
satisfaction ratings (Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Type of Plea   G 1.085 1 .298 .003 
  Traditional 6.05 (2.65) 5.69 
(2.96) 
T .885 1 .348 .002 
  Alford 5.72 (2.45) 5.52 
(2.67) 
G x T .610 1 .772 < .001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea 
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Table 23 
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt status, split 
between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 40.179* 1 <. 001 .165 
  Traditional 6.24 (2.68) 3.52 (2.04) T .511 1 .476 .002 
  Alford 5.81 (2.50) 3.37 (2.31) G x T .118 1 .732 .001 
Reject 
Type of Plea   G 4.313* 1 .039 .022 
  Traditional 5.42 (2.50) 6.33 (2.89) T .007 1 .932 < .001 
  Alford 5.38 (2.29) 6.29 (2.36) G x T .000 1 .996 < .001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05 
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Table 24 
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status, split between 
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2) 
 Guilty Innocent      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Accept        
Type of Plea   G 9.825* 1 .002 .046 
  Traditional 7.77 (2.77) 8.65 (2.23) T .722 1 .722 .001 
  Alford 7.20 (2.75) 8.93 (1.11) G x T 1.031 1 .311 .005 
Reject 
Type of Plea   G .465 1 .496 .002 
  Traditional 7.92 (2.41) 7.81 (2.56) T .320 1 .573 .002 
  Alford 7.86 (2.49) 7.39 (2.47) G x T .7181 1 .671 .001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .01 
 
  
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  114 
 
Table 25 
Means and ANOVA statistics for case evaluation measures (Study 2) 
                 Guilty                          
Innocent 
     
 Trad. Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Crime 
Severity 
8.61 8.39 8.66 8.71  G 1.005 1 .317 .004 
 (1.91) (1.72) (1.76) (1.98) T .239 1 .626 .004 
     G x T .519 1 .472 .001 
Strength of  6.56 6.36 3.25 2.75 G 219.43* 1 <.001 .353 
Evidence (2.63) (2.46) (2.38) (1.90) T 2.274 1 .132 .006 
     G x T .409 1 .523 .001 
Likelihood of  70.4 70.2 42.1 44.9 G 105.93* 1 <.001 .209 
Conviction (24.1) (22.2) (29.1) (25.1) T .0127 1 .910 <.001 
     G x T .827 1 .827 <.001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001 
 
  
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  115 
 
Table 26 
Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 2) 
     Guilty                    Innocent      
 Trad.  Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Consequences      G 9.06* 1 .003 .022 
of rejecting 
plea 
7.94 8.04 7.24 7.23  T .029 1 .865 <.001 
 (2.59) (2.51) (2.80) (2.55) G x T .048 1 .827 <.001 
Consequences      G 17.561* 1 <.001 .042 
of accepting 
plea 
7.93 7.88 5.83 6.95  T .093 1 .890 <.001 
 (2.17) (2.37) (2.71) (2.48) G x T .125 1 .724 <.001 
Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001 
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Table 28 
Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea decision 
(Study 3). 
 Accept Reject Total 
Traditional 43.3% 12.1% 27% 
Alford 42.5% 14.9% 29% 
Total 42.9%a 13.4%a  
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Table 29 
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of confidence in guilt perception ratings 
(Study 3 and 4) 
Study 3        
 Accept Reject      
 M (SD) M (SD) Effect F df p η2p 
Type of Plea   P 1.29 1 .257 .003 
  Traditional 7.04 (1.87) 7.09 
(1.88) 
T 2.20 1 .138 .005 
  Alford 6.58 (2.22) 7.11 
(1.85) 
P x T 1.48 1 .225 .004 
Study 4 
Type of Plea   P .001 1 .974 < .001 
  Traditional 7.04 (1.82) 6.90 
(1.87) 
T .810 1 .810 < .001 
  Alford 6.94 (2.13) 6.99 
(2.10) 
P x T .632 1 .637 .001 
Note. P = plea decision, T = type of plea. 
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Table 30 
Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception measures (Study 3) 
                 Accept                       Reject      
 Trad.  Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Right Plea  5.22 5.50 7.38 5.60  P 56.549* 1 <.001 .122 
Decision (2.85) (2.69) (2.17) (2.13) T .034 1 .854 < 
.001 
     P x T 1.80 1 .180 .004 
Same Plea  5.00 5.45 7.75 7.75 P 80.48* 1 <.001 .165 
Decision (2.90) (2.93) (2.22) (2.45) T .024 1 .876 <.001 
     P x T 2.51 1 .114 .006 
Fairness 
of  
5.10 4.87 4.60 4.38 Pa 3.759 1 .053 .009 
Plea (2.93) (2.69) (2.43) (2.35) T .791 1 .375 .002 
     P x T .979 1 .979 <.001 
Note. Subscript represents a borderline significant result, p = .053. P = plea decision, T = type of 
plea. *p < .05 
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Table 31 
Percentage of participants reporting they would personally reject (vs. accept) by type of plea and 
plea decision (Study 3) 
 Accept Reject Total 
Traditional 66% 78.5% 72.5% 
Alford 78.5% 76.2% 67.1% 
Total 62.1%a 77.4%a  
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p > 
.001). 
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Table 32 
Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of the defendant ratings (Study 3) 
 Accept Reject      
 Trad.  Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Composite 10.45  9.93  12.24 11.79 P 62.196* 1 <.001 .133 
Score (2.50) (2.47) (2.16) (2.22) T 4.404* 1 .036 .011 
     P x T 1.932 1 .882 .005 
Competence 3.60 3.54 4.05 3.81  P* 14.584* 1 <.001 .035 
 (.947) (.917) (.829) (.868) T 3.887* 1 .049 .009 
     P x T .490 1 .484 .001 
Intelligence 3.64 3.52 3.99 3.87 P 16.21* 1 <.001 .038 
 (.949) (.897) (.852) (.845) T 1.88 1 .171 .005 
     P x T .000 1 .996 <.001 
Confidence 3.16 2.88 4.21 4.11 P 133.4* 1 <.001 .247 
 (1.12) (1.13) (.833) (.871) Ta 3.82 1 .051 .009 
     P x T .941 1 .332 .002 
Friendliness 3.70 3.48 3.69 3.58 P .381 1 .538 .001 
 (.779) (.759) (.806) (.725) T 4.657* 1 .032 .011 
     P x T .459 1 .459 .001 
Honesty 3.58 3.19 3.73 3.78 P 14.93* 1 <.001 .023 
 (1.01) (.977) (.967) (.955) T 3.03 1 .083 .007 
     P x T 5.25* 1 .022 .035 
Note. Subscript denotates borderline significant effect (p = .051). P = plea decision, T = type of 
plea. * < .05. 
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Table 33 
Means and ANOVA statistics for measures of student defendant remorsefulness and 
blameworthiness (Study 3) 
 Accept Reject      









Effect F df p η2p 
Remorsefulness 3.40 3.15 2.76 2.67 P 40.26* 1 <.001 .090 
 (.399) (.826) (1.04) (.896) Ta 3.582 1 .059 .009 
     P x T .895 1 .345 .002 
Blameworthiness 4.72 4.60 3.93 3.71 P 10.774* 1 .001 .026 
 (3.01) (2.56) (2.32) (2.45) T .507 1 .507 .001 
     P x T .839 1 .839 <.001 
Note. Subscript denotates borderline significant effect (p = .059). P = plea decision, T = type of 
plea. * < .05. 
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Table 35 
Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea decision 
(Study 4) 
 Accept Reject Total 
Traditional 58.4% 39% 48.1% 
Alford 53.4% 39.4% 46.5% 
Total 55.7%a 39.2%a  
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p > 
.001). 
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Table 36 
Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception ratings (Study 4) 
              Accept                       Reject      
 Trad.  Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Right Plea  6.16 6.57 5.76 5.60  P 7.252* 1 .007 .007 
Decision (2.43) (2.43) (2.59) (2.61) T .243 1 .622 .001 
     P x T 1.29 1 .257 .003 
Same Plea  6.47 6.63 5.91 6.14 Pa 26.940 1 .056 .009 
Decision (2.54) (2.68) (2.83) (2.77) T .507 1 .477 .001 
     P x T .895 1 .895 < .001 
Fairness of  6.30 6.14 5.96 6.22 P .484 1 .487 .009 
Plea (2.18) (2.93) (2.72) (2.50) T .001 1 .975 .001 
     P x T .363 1 .547 .001 
Note. Subscription represents a borderline significant result, p = .056. G = guilt status, T = type 
of plea. *p < .05 
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Table 37 
Percentage of participants reporting they would personally accept (vs. reject) by type of plea and 
plea decision (Study 4)  
 Accept Reject Total 
Traditional 66.3% 42% 53.4% 
Alford 66% 47.5% 56.9% 
Total 66.1%a 22.6%a  
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Table 38 
Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of the defendant ratings (Study 4) 
 Accept Reject      
 Trad. Alford Trad.  Alford      








Effect F df p η2p 
Composite 11.1  11  11.8 11.9 P 10.307* 1 .001 .026 
 (2.35) (2.43) (2.21) (2.24) T .008 1 .929 < .001 
     P x T .806 1 .806 < .001 
Competence 3.90 3.81 3.94 3.89  P .399 1 .528 .001 
 (.93) (.97) (1.03) (.94) T .539 1 .463 .001 
     P x T .831 1 .831 < .001 
Intelligence 3.82 3.84 3.85 3.85 P .813 1 .813 < .001 
 (.912) (.872) (.957) (.904) T .858 1 .858 < .001 
     P x T .932 1 .932 < .001 
Confidence 3.34 3.37 3.96 4.08 P 51.05* 1 <.001 .117 
 (.988) (1.07) (.803) (.804) T .668 1 .414 .002 
     P x T .668 1 .643 .001 
Friendliness 3.76 3.77 3.97 3.86 P 3.09 1 .079 .001 
 (.779) (.759) (.806) (.725) T .412 1 .521 .008 
     P x T .485 1 .499 .001 
Honesty 4.15 4.14 3.87 3.82 P 9.22* 1 .003 .023 
 (.847) (.940) (1.05) (.937) T .073 1 .788 <.001 
     P x T .027 1 .870 <.001 
Note. P = plea decision, T = type of plea. * < .05. 
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Table 39 
Means and ANOVA statistics for defendant remorsefulness and blameworthiness (Study 4) 
   Accept   Reject      
 Trad. Alford Trad.  Alford      
 M (SD) M 
(SD) 
M (SD) M 
(SD) 
Effect F df p η2p 
Remorsefulness 4.13 3.83 3.47 3.27 P 36.598* 1 <.001 .086 
 (.828) (.933) (1.12) (1.05) T 6.345* 1 .012 .016 
     P x T .577 1 .577 .001 
Blameworthiness 6.13 5.57 5.58 5.68 P .905 1 .342 .086 
 (2.23) (2.26) (2.31) (2.22) T .964 1 .327 .002 
     P x T 1.932 1 .165 .005 
Note. P = plea decision, T = type of plea. *p < .001 
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Table 41 
Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by plea condition (Study 5). 
 With full sample With only those who 
passed 
With only those who 
failed 
Traditional 57.8% 57.8%a 0% 
Alford 47.7% 43%a 20.7% 
Alford initiated by 
defendant 
46.3% 25.5%a 35.7% 
Note. Values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p > .05).   
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Table 42 
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects on plea decision perception ratings (Study 
5).  
 Traditional  Alford Alford 
initiated by 
defendant 
    
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F df p η2p 
Right Plea Decision 6.12 (2.60) 5.80 (2.62) 6.39 (2.52) 1.75 1 .175 .009 
Same Plea Decision 6.35 (2.73) 6.02 (2.69) 6.54 (2.66) 1.24 1 .291 .006 
Fairness of Plea 6.35 (2.61) 6.04 (2.58) 6.01 (2.66) .680 1 .507 .003 
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Table 43 
Counts and percentage of participants who would personally accept a plea, by plea condition 
(Study 5) 
Type of Plea Count (%) 
Traditional 77 (57%) 
Alford 74 (56.1%) 
Alford initiated by defendant 74 (55.2%) 
 
  
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  133 
 
Table 44 
Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on perceptions of the defendant ratings (Study 5) 
 Traditional Alford Alford*  F df p η2p 




1.071 2 .344 .005 




1.26 2 .258 .006 




.824 2 .440 .004 




.385 2 .680 .002 




.754 2 .471 .004 




1.36 2 .259 .007 




8.52* 2 <.001 .041 




.920 2 .406 005 
Note. *Alford initiated by defendant. ** p< .001.
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Figure 2 
Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on participants’ rating of the difficulty to make a 
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Figure 3 
Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on the degree to which consequences of rejecting 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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Appendix A 
Questions Study 1 & 2 
1. Imagine yourself in this situation. Would you sign the guilty plea offered by the 
[experimenter/prosecutor]? (circle one) 
 
   Yes    No 
 
2. How confident are you in this decision to accept or reject the plea offer?  
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Very 
 
3. How long was the sentence in the final deal you were offered by the experimenter (in months)? 
________________________________________________________________ 






5. Did you cheat on the experimental task by helping the other student? 
 
   Yes    No 
6. The plea I was offered required that I admit guilt and take responsibility for the cheating. 
 
True                           False      I don’t know 
 
7. Given that this study is examining your decision-making process, it is important to us that you 
pay attention to each instruction. In order to show us that you are, please choose "Somewhat 
agree" below, and then move on to the next question. 
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8. Out of 100 outside observers who watch the [experimenter’s accusation/ police and 
prosecutor’s accusation] + your decision to accept or reject the plea offer, how many would 
believe that you [cheated/are guilty]? (circle one) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
9. How difficult would be this decision to accept or reject the plea offer? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  A lot 
 
10. How satisfied would you be with this decision to accept or reject the plea offer?  
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  A lot 
 
11. How much pressure would you have felt to accept the plea offer?  
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  A lot 
 
12. In your opinion, how serious was the wrongdoing (the cheating/involuntary manslaughter) 
you were accused of? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Very 
 
13. In your opinion, how strong was the evidence that you cheated in this experiment? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Very 
 
14. As far as you can tell, if you were to appear before the Academic Integrity Board, what is the 
likelihood you would be found guilty of cheating? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
15. To what extent was your decision influenced by what would happen if you rejected the plea 
offer (being tried by the academic integrity board)? 
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Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  To a 
great extent 
 
16. To what extent was your decision influenced by what would happen if you accepted the plea 
offer (the hours of community service)? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  To a 
great extent 
 
17. To what extent was your decision to accept the plea offer influenced by the opportunity to 
state for the record that you were innocent? (only in Alford plea condition) 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  A lot 
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Appendix B 
STUDY 2 - Vignette 
I. SET UP 
It’s summer and you are invited to an early dinner with two friends from college at their house. 
You haven’t seen them for several months, and you are excited to spend some time with them. 
 
You get into your car to drive over and arrive early in the evening. Your friends have prepared a 
great meal, from appetizers to dessert, and you have a fun night together catching up, with great 
conversations and games. 
 
You have to get up early the next morning, so you don’t drink any alcohol and you make it a point 
to leave before it’s totally dark out. 
After agreeing to meet up again soon, you say your goodbyes, get into your car, and drive off. 
II. THE “CRIME” 
You are tired and eager to get home. As you turn right on a sharp corner you feel a loud thump. 
immediately you get out of the car and see that you have hit an old man. He is sprawled on the 
street and unconscious. 
A. GUILTY 
Imagine yourself in that situation. You were driving a lot faster than the speed limit—and you knew 
it. If you had been driving slower, you may well have seen the pedestrian and avoided hitting him.  
OR 
B. INNOCENT 
Imagine yourself in that situation. You were driving at or below the speed limit—and you knew it. 
You did nothing wrong. But the pedestrian appeared out of nowhere, so you had no chance to stop 
and avoid hitting him.   
You call 911 and within five minutes the police and an ambulance arrive at the scene. The 
ambulance takes the man to the hospital. At this point, the police ask if you would be willing to go 
with them to the station: “We just want to get a statement from you.” You agree and they put you 
in the back of the patrol car. 
 
III. ACCUSATION 
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Once you arrive, you are left alone in an interview room for fifteen minutes. At that point, a police 
officer returns and says:  
“We were just informed that the man you hit died on his way to the hospital. The medical examiner 
tells us that his injuries were caused by a high-impact collision.  
It is clear to us that you were speeding if not worse. This is a serious matter. We spoke to the 
prosecutor. She is planning to charge you with involuntary manslaughter. 
The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintended killing of a person by acting in a 
reckless or negligent manner. This crime carries a sentence of up to five years in prison. 
This means you will go to trial. If the prosecution convinces the jury that you were careless or 
reckless, you will be found guilty and sentenced for up to five years in prison. If the prosecution 
fails to convince the jury, you walk free.” 
 
IV. PLEA OFFER 
Free on bail, you call a public defender to advise you. He comes back and reports that “The 
prosecutor has offered you a deal: She will reduce your total sentence if you plead guilty to the 
offense of involuntary manslaughter.” You hesitate and shake your head. At this point, your 
attorney contacts the prosecutor again, who offers this alternative and final offer: 
 A. GUILTY PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” you will be required to 6 months in a county prison. You will not need to go 
to trial. The guilty plea will go on your record but once you’ve served the time, you’re done.  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” you will be charged with involuntary manslaughter and tried 
within the next several weeks. If you are found guilty, the judge will determine what larger 
punishment is appropriate (3-5 years in prison). If you are acquitted, you walk free.  
OR 
B. ALFORD PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” you will be required to serve 6 months in a county prison. You will not need 
to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on your record but once you’ve served the time, you’re done.  
Then he adds: “The prosecutor has agreed that you could also handwrite on the agreement that 
while you accept the plea and its terms, you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or 
otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 6 months in prison, but the statement of your 
innocence would also go on your record.”  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” you will be charged with involuntary manslaughter and tried 
within the next several weeks. If you are found guilty, the judge will determine what larger 
punishment is appropriate (3-5 years). If you are acquitted, you walk free.  
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Appendix C 
STUDY 3 - Vignette 
I. SET UP 
Michael Anderson attends a public university and has signed up for a study, for course credit, titled 
“Individual and Group Problem Solving.” 
He schedules an appointment and when he arrives at the waiting area of a psychology laboratory, 
he is met by a female experimenter and a fellow student, someone he doesn’t know.  
 Michael and the other student are taken to a room inside, furnished with two tables and two chairs, 
and the experimenter explains that they will complete a series of questions modeled after the TV 
show Family Feud. They will be asked to answer some questions individually, some as a team. For 
the joint task, Michael and the other student are told to work together and discuss the categories; 
for the individual part, they are told to not talk to each other and solve the task on their own. 
The study seems straightforward. The experimenter hands Michael and the other student each an 
“individual” question for Round 1, leaves the room, then returns when the time is up. Then she 
hands them each the “group” question for Round 2, and leaves. This time Michael and the other 
student discuss and work together to come up with answers. The experimenter then returns when 
the time is up. These first couple of rounds pass uneventfully. 
 
II. THE “CRIME” 
The session proceeds through Rounds 3 and 4. But then the experimenter returns and says: “We 
have a problem. It looks like you cheated by working together on the second individual problem 
set.” At that point, the Experimenter removes the other student from the room and says to Michael, 
“I need to talk to both of you and then I need to check with my supervisor.” 
 Michael waits alone in the room for fifteen minutes. At that point, the experimenter returns and 
says:  
“It’s clear to me now that you cheated, that you helped each other on an individual problem. I knew 
I heard voices during Round 3. Plus, the odds of two people independently coming up with exactly 
the same unlikely answers is like less than one percent. 
I talked to my supervisor, the principal investigator of this research. He is very upset. This is just 
the kind of thing that can invalidate the study and make it difficult to get funding in the future. 
As far as he is concerned, this act of cheating violates the university’s honor code. He wants to take 
you to the Academic Integrity Board (AIB) for a hearing. It’s like a trial. We will present our 
evidence, you’ll have an opportunity to state your case, and the Board will render a verdict 
(historically they convict about half the students who appear). I’ll be honest: This is serious stuff.” 
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III. PLEA OFFER 
Then the experimenter says to Michael: “I think I talked my supervisor down. If you are willing to 
plead guilty by signing and dating this short form I wrote up, you won’t have to appear for a trial 
before the AIB.” 
A. GUILTY PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit that he cheated and agree to 
perform forty hours of community service at the university. He will take full responsibility for the 
cheating and the data loss it caused. In exchange, the professor won’t file charges. Michael is told 
that the plea will go on the university’s internal record but once he has served the time, he’s done.  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the experimenter tells Michael, he will be scheduled for a 
hearing at the university within the next few weeks. The AIB will then render a verdict. If they find 
him guilty, they will determine what larger punishment is appropriate. 
OR 
B. ALFORD PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, it means he agrees to perform forty hours of community 
service at the university. In exchange, the professor won’t file charges against him. Michael is told 
that the plea will go on the university’s internal record but once Michael has served the time, he’s 
done. 
Then the experimenter tells Michael: “If you want, you can also handwrite a personal statement on 
the agreement stating that while you accept the plea and its terms, you are in fact innocent and did 
not cheat. That statement would become part of the file. This means you would not have to take 
responsibility or admit guilt for cheating.”  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the experimenter tells Michael, he will be scheduled for a 
hearing at the university within the next few weeks. The AIB will then render a verdict. If they find 
him guilty, they will determine what larger punishment is appropriate.” 
 
IV. DECISION 
 Michael considered the experimenter’s offer to plead guilty vs. plead not guilty and go to trial.   
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD GUILTY according to the terms of the 
agreement he was offered. 
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD NOT GUILTY and go to trial instead. 
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Appendix D 
Questions Study 3 & 4 
1. Based on what you have read, do you believe that Michael is guilty or not guilty of 
[cheating/involuntary manslaughter?] (circle one) 
Guilty     Not Guilty  
 
2. How confident are you in this opinion? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Very 
 
3. How long was the "sentence" in the final deal Michael was offered by the experimenter (in 
hours of community service)? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The plea Michael was offered required that he admit guilt and take responsibility for the 
cheating. 
 
True      False     I don’t know 
 
5. To what extent do you think that Michael made the right plea decision? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 To a great 
extent 
 
6. What decision do you think you would make if you were in Michael’s situation? (choose one) 
Accept the plea    Reject the plea 
 
6. How likely is it that you would have made the same decision if you were in Michael’s 
situation? 
Not at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Very 
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7. Given that this study is examining your decision-making process, it is important to us that you 
pay attention to each instruction. In order to show us that you are, please choose "Somewhat 
agree" below, and then move on to the next question. 










8. How fair do you think the plea offer was? 
Not at all fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10     Very fair 
 
9. To what extent is Michael to blame for the situation he is in? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10    Fully to blame 
 
10. Please rate to what degree you agree/disagree with the following statements regarding your 

















 Michael is 
competent.  o  o  o  o  o  
 Michael is 
intelligent. o  o  o  o  o  
 Michael is 
confident.  o  o  o  o  o  
Michael is 
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Appendix E 
STUDY 4 - Vignette 
I. SET UP 
Michael Anderson was invited to an early dinner with two friends from college at their house. He 
hadn’t seen them in several months and was excited to spend some time with them. 
He got into his car and drove over early in the evening. His friends had prepared a great meal, 
from appetizers to dessert. They had a fun night together catching up, with great conversations 
and games. 
Michael has to get up early the next morning, so he didn’t drink any alcohol and made it a point 
to leave before it was totally dark out. 
After agreeing to meet up again soon, he said his goodbyes, got into his car, and drove off. 
II. THE “CRIME” 
Michael was tired and eager to get home. As he turned right on a sharp corner, he felt a loud thump. 
Immediately he got out of the car and saw that he had hit an old man. The man is sprawled on the 
street and unconscious.  
 Michael called 911 and within five minutes the police and an ambulance arrived at the scene. The 
ambulance takes the man to the hospital. At that point, the police asked Michael if he would be 
willing to go with them to the station: “We just want to get a statement from you.” Michael agreed 
and was put in the back of the patrol car. 
Once he arrived, Michael was left alone in an interview room for fifteen minutes. At that point, a 
police officer returned and said:  
“We were just informed that the man you hit died on his way to the hospital. The medical examiner 
tells us that his injuries were caused by a high-impact collision.  
It is clear to us that you were speeding if not worse. This is a serious matter. We spoke to the 
prosecutor. She is planning to charge you with involuntary manslaughter. 
The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintended killing of a person by acting in a 
reckless or negligent manner. This crime carries a sentence of up to five years in prison. 
This means you will go to trial. If the prosecution convinces the jury that you were careless or 
reckless, you will be found guilty and sentenced for up to five years in prison. If the prosecution 
fails to convince the jury, you walk free.” 
 
III. PLEA OFFER 
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Free on bail, Michael calls a public defender to advise him. The attorney comes back and reports 
that “The prosecutor has offered you a deal, Michael: She will reduce your total sentence if you 
plead guilty to the offense of involuntary manslaughter.”  
 A. GUILTY PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit guilt and 6 months in a county 
prison. He will take full responsibility for the crime and the damage he caused. In exchange for 
admitting guilt, he would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he 
has served the time, he’s done.  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary 
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine 
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told, 
he walks free.  
OR 
B. ALFORD PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to serve 6 months in county prison. He 
would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he has served the time, 
he’s done.  
 Then he adds: “The prosecutor has agreed that you could also handwrite on the agreement that 
while you accept the plea and its terms, you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or 
otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 6 months in prison, but the statement of your 
innocence would also go on your record. This means you would not have to take responsibility or 
admit guilt for the crime.”  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary 
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine 
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told, 
he walks free.  
 
IV. DECISION 
 Michael considered the experimenter’s offer to plead guilty vs. plead not guilty and go to trial.   
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD GUILTY according to the terms of the 
agreement he was offered. 
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD NOT GUILTY and go to trial instead. 
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Appendix F 
STUDY 5 - Vignette 
I. SET UP 
Michael Anderson was invited to an early dinner with two friends from college at their house. He 
hadn’t seen them in several months and was excited to spend some time with them. 
He got into his car and drove over early in the evening. His friends had prepared a great meal, 
from appetizers to dessert. They had a fun night together catching up, with great conversations 
and games. 
Michael has to get up early the next morning, so he didn’t drink any alcohol and made it a point 
to leave before it was totally dark out. 
After agreeing to meet up again soon, he said his goodbyes, got into his car, and drove off. 
II. THE “CRIME” 
Michael was tired and eager to get home. As he turned right on a sharp corner, he felt a loud thump. 
Immediately he got out of the car and saw that he had hit an old man. The man is sprawled on the 
street and unconscious.  
 Michael called 911 and within five minutes the police and an ambulance arrived at the scene. The 
ambulance takes the man to the hospital. At that point, the police asked Michael if he would be 
willing to go with them to the station: “We just want to get a statement from you.” Michael agreed 
and was put in the back of the patrol car. 
Once he arrived, Michael was left alone in an interview room for fifteen minutes. At that point, a 
police officer returned and said:  
“We were just informed that the man you hit died on his way to the hospital. The medical examiner 
tells us that his injuries were caused by a high-impact collision.  
It is clear to us that you were speeding if not worse. This is a serious matter. We spoke to the 
prosecutor. She is planning to charge you with involuntary manslaughter. 
The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintended killing of a person by acting in a 
reckless or negligent manner. This crime carries a sentence of up to five years in prison. 
This means you will go to trial. If the prosecution convinces the jury that you were careless or 
reckless, you will be found guilty and sentenced for up to five years in prison. If the prosecution 
fails to convince the jury, you walk free.” 
 
III. PLEA OFFER 
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Free on bail, Michael calls a public defender to advise him. The attorney comes back and reports 
that “The prosecutor has offered you a deal, Michael: She will reduce your total sentence if you 
plead guilty to the offense of involuntary manslaughter.”  
 A. GUILTY PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit guilt and 6 months in a county 
prison. He will take full responsibility for the crime and the damage he caused. In exchange for 
admitting guilt, he would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he 
has served the time, he’s done.  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary 
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine 
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told, 
he walks free.  
OR 
B. ALFORD PLEA 
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to serve 6 months in county prison. He 
would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he has served the time, 
he’s done.  
 Then he adds: “The prosecutor has agreed that you could also handwrite on the agreement that 
while you accept the plea and its terms, you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or 
otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 6 months in prison, but the statement of your 
innocence would also go on your record. This means you would not have to take responsibility or 
admit guilt for the crime.”  
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary 
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine 
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told, 
he walks free.  
OR 
C. ALFORD PLEA INITATED BY DEFENDANT  
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit guilt and serve 6 months in a 
county prison. He will take full responsibility for the crime and the damage he caused. In 
exchange for admitting guilt, he would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his 
record but once he has served the time, he’s done. 
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with 
involuntary manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge 
will determine what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, 
Michael is told, he walks free. 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
  153 
 
Michael hesitates. He tells his lawyer that he does not want to take the plea because he is 
innocent. He says he didn’t commit this crime he is accused of. 
Michael’s attorney speaks to the prosecutor again. She returns and says: “The prosecutor has 
agreed that you could handwrite on the agreement that while you accept the plea and its terms, 
you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 
6 months in prison, but the statement of your innocence would also go on your record. 
IV. DECISION 
 Michael considered the experimenter’s offer to plead guilty vs. plead not guilty and go to trial.   
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD GUILTY according to the terms of the 
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